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The Internet has been lauded as an open and free platform from which one is able to 
engage with, and share large amounts of information (Stallman, 1997).  As one 
witnesses the shift from analogue media to digitalism, so too is it possible to note a 
change in cultural practices of media consumers.  Users of the media can now be 
viewed as “prosumers”, producing as well as consuming media products (Marshall, 
2004).  Digital media users have been given the ability to engineer their own unique 
media experiences, especially within the realms of the Internet.  However, this 
process has seemingly led to mass copyright infringement as Internet users 
appropriate various movies, music, television programmes, photographs and 
animations in order to create such an experience.  The art of digital mashing in 
particular, has been deemed an explicit exploitation of intellectual property rights as it 
re-cuts, re-mixes and re-broadcasts popular media in a number of alternative ways.  
YouTube especially has been at the forefront of the copyright furore surrounding 
digital mash-ups because it allows online users the facility to post and share these 
video clips freely with other online users.  While YouTube claims that they do not 
promote the illegal use of copyrighted material, they simultaneously acknowledge that 
they do not actively patrol that which is posted on their website.  As such, copyright 
infringement appears seemingly rife as users share their own versions of popular 
media through the art of digital mashing.  This dissertation however, explores the 
concept that the creation of mash-ups is not undermining intellectual property rights, 
but instead produces a new avenue from which culture can emerge.  It highlights how 
Internet users are utilising the culture which surrounds them in an attempt to navigate 
the new social structures of the online, subsequently arguing that mash-ups are an 
important element of defining a new postmodern culture, and that the traditional 
copyright laws of analogue need to be modified in order to secure the development of 
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BitTorrent: A peer-to-peer file system which allows users to break large 
files into smaller files in order to download information faster. 
 
Digital Mash-up: Process whereby media consumers “cut” various pieces of 
media and remix them into a coherent narrative whole.   
 
Interactivity: The two-way participation of online users with digital 
technology. 
 
Peer-to-peer network: An online communication network which allows Internet users 
the ability to share and manage files collectively. 
 
Sampling: Process whereby a musical artist takes aspects of another song 
and integrates it into their own music to enhance their music.  
 
User: A person who uses digital technology; usually associated with 
Internet use. 
 
Video Sharing: Online videos which are shared openly and freely among 
Internet users.  
 
Viral Video: An online video which has amassed large popularity through e-
mails and video sharing sites.  
 
Web 2.0: Second generation of Web development; focuses on the 
interactive participation of users through visual and aural cues.  
 
Chapter One – Introduction: 
 
 
As the Internet becomes more and more interactive in terms of usability, it has 
seen the rise of an online ‘prosumer’ culture whereby users have become both 
producers and consumers of online content (Marshall, 2004).  Sites such as YouTube 
have epitomised this online behaviour by allowing users the opportunity to broadcast 
their own various forms of digital video ranging from eyewitness quasi-journalistic 
coverage of real events, through personal videos of family occasions, to purely 
creative output.  The latter, however, incorporates a wide range of material, and most 
often utilises some sort of material developed by others, invariably soundtracks, but 
often movie or video footage which has been reworked in some way, sometimes as a 
form of social parody, and at other times as sheer entertainment.  While this can be 
seen as a positive expansion of digital media in terms of speeding up the globalisation 
process and giving users the platform to display various aspects of their creativity and 
points of view (Friedman, 2006), it does have massive implications in terms of 
intellectual property rights.  This type of freedom has led to many users taking 
existing media forms and manipulating them to form what can be termed a unique 
artistic creation.  However, one must question what effect this type of artistic creation 
is having on traditional intellectual property rights, which look toward ensuring the 
financial security and control of intellectual authors (Wirtén, 2004). 
 
Since its commercial inception in the early nineties, the Internet has become a 
contentious environment in terms of copyright protection.  During this time, much 
research was dedicated to exploring the notions of open-source software and its 
effects on the global political economy, as well as the newly emergent cyber-culture 
(Ermann et al, 1995).  Historically, the Internet was seen as a tool “to disseminate and 
acquire information” (De Villiers, 2000: 37), and not as an instrument from which one 
was able to create or maintain an income; consequently, it was never seen as a threat 
to intellectual property rights.   However, “the economic potential of the Internet was 
[soon] realised” (De Villiers, 2000: 37), with many utilising it for its economic gains, 
through both artistic and practical means.  The economic gains that the Internet has to 
offer were further bolstered by the introduction of Web 2.0 in the early part of the 
new millennium, and the increased features of interactivity that it allows.  
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However, possibly the most important principle concerning the success of 
Web 2.0 and the interactive features that it offers, is its ability to “harness collective 
intelligence” (O’Reilly, 2005).  Web 2.0 users aim to utilise existing knowledge of the 
Internet, in order to appropriate it in their own particular means as well as build upon 
that existing knowledge (O’Reilly, 2005).  In the case of YouTube, for example, users 
take existing media forms which are available to them from the site and manipulate it 
in such a way that they are able to create a ‘mash-up’ of various media forms resulting 
in their own unique perspective of each individual medium.  However, this does raise 
questions surrounding intellectual property rights and copyright infringement.  
Therefore, this research will attempt to identify what these questions are and try to 
come up with a viable solution aimed toward solving them.      
 
As previously mentioned, the early part of Internet research concentrated on 
identifying the negative effects of open-source and shared online knowledge.  This 
generally resulted from users not acknowledging the source of the knowledge that 
they were using to build their own ‘unique’ forms of digital media (Ermann et al, 
1995).  The main issue that arose out of this, was the reality that many digital 
designers were not being credited for the work that they had done, and so were losing 
out financially to designs and ideas that they normally would have been able to gain a 
livelihood from (Ermann et al, 1995).  However, with global consumerism, this type 
of thinking seems to have become outdated with the advent of Web 2.0, with most 
writers concentrating heavily on the benefits that increased interactivity and open 
knowledge sharing has brought about (Coombe, 1998; Friedman, 2006; Poster, 2008).  
While it is true that the features of Web 2.0 have been beneficial to global 
communications, it has also been seen as having a detrimental effect on the global 
attitude toward copyright law and intellectual property rights, because information 
present online is digitised, and as a result makes “the copying and distribution of such 
works virtually effortless, instantaneous and perfect” (De Villiers, 2000: 39), with 
many users now believing that it is acceptable to copy freely and distribute the 
intellectual works of others.  In order to balance these two opposing positions, one 
should take a traditional ethical standpoint in order to negotiate this dilemma, and in 
so doing, reach a convincing conclusion regarding the mass collaboration of online 
information, intellectual property rights and copyright law. 
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Many may disagree with this course of action because one would assume that 
when addressing an issue such as the infringement of copyright, one would confer 
with the appropriate law in order to reach a viable solution.  However, one of the 
major problems in terms of protecting the copyright of one’s artistic work is that 
copyright is entirely territorial in nature.  This means that copyright laws are 
completely dependent on the country of origin of each specific work (Cornish, 1989; 
De Villiers, 2000), and because the Internet is free from control from any one nation 
state, it cannot be governed in the same way as traditional copyright law dictates.  
Subsequently, discussing this issue through ethical theory, in consultation with the 
specific laws pertaining to copyright, becomes the most pertinent way in which to 
solve this contentious issue.  Therefore, this research aims to explore three key areas 
in order to determine in what ways these rights can still be protected, or if otherwise, 
how they can be re-negotiated, within a virtual and “lawless” environment. 
 
Firstly, this research will explore and discuss general cyber-ethical theory 
before branching into the debate surrounding intellectual property rights.  One of the 
main issues which will be addressed is the idea that general ethical codes have always 
dictated that one of the most “fundamental and longstanding ethical traditions is to 
recognise the social value of free […] access to information” (Alfino, 1991).  This 
statement validates the notion that information and knowledge should be openly 
shared with one another, and thus could be argued to encourage a concept such as the 
open-source collaboration of online information.  This branch of thinking also 
highlights that the copying and sharing of knowledge cannot be deemed as theft 
because it does not “involve the removal [of] property” (Alfino, 1991).  While this 
could be seen as a valid argument in some regard, a problem arises if one considers 
that intellectual property has never been an actual physical entity, and so cannot be 
protected by the same laws that govern the protection of physical objects.   
 
In fact, if one was to adopt a socialist approach, as proposed by thinkers such 
as Prudhon (Templeton, n.d), one could argue that the ownership of property in itself 
is theft.  This stems from the thinking that if one owns something and has control over 
it, it deprives the rest of the world of that object.  However, this is a rather idealistic 
approach if one considers the capital-centred economy of most modern democracies. 
The creators of intellectual property have traditionally, in these societies, been 
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employed and paid in exchange for their ideas.  This makes defending the mass 
collaboration of knowledge within a free social space problematic because this reward 
system has become the social norm of intellectual property development.  As such, a 
balance needs to be found between the free exchange of knowledge that cyber-culture 
promotes, and that of protecting the financial rights of intellectual authors.   
 
However, the Internet and the information contained therein can be seen as 
free from the control of any one nation state, and so it becomes difficult to protect 
intellectual property rights under any one common law, resulting in a number of 
international treaties.  This introduces the second key area of this research, which will 
assist in reaching a viable equilibrium between protecting copyright and protecting 
the general ethical morals surrounding the distribution of online knowledge.  Through 
the exploration of both South African and American copyright law, as well as the 
many international agreements surrounding intellectual property that each of these 
countries adheres to, it will be determined how viable this type of law is within an 
ever-evolving cyber-culture of shareware (Gitelman, 2006).  These countries have 
been chosen specifically because firstly, South Africa is the country of origin for this 
research and so the results will be of most use in the South African context, and 
secondly, the United States is the mass media entertainment capital of the world 
(Poster, 2008), and can be used as a good comparative example to South African 
legislation in order to determine what measures should be taken to protect a country 
so economically dependent on its intellectual property.   
 
As previously discussed, much of the protection involving intellectual 
property has to do with the control of information, and so one must also consider the 
concept of the political economy within the online world.  Marshall (2004) has 
indicated that cyber-culture today is controlled and maintained by each individual 
user, who customises their experience to their own specific means.  However, 
Friedman (2006) has indicated that corporations, whilst simultaneously crying foul to 
these users, are utilising these users’ abilities in order to bolster their own products 
and services.  Therefore, one needs to explore if the traditional lines of cyber-culture 
control are shifting toward a new type of ownership, or if those who were originally in 
control are still manipulating and playing a major role in the production of digital 
media, and if this type of manipulation is ethical in terms of individuals losing what 
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would have been revenue, were they not promoting and practicing a free knowledge 
economy online. 
 
This research does not propose to solve the problems surrounding intellectual 
property infringements by new media users, nor does it seek to reach an ethical 
judgement surrounding these users’ online collaborative behaviour.  Instead, it aims to 
determine whether the laws surrounding intellectual property itself are ethically 
coherent in a cyber-culture which has formulated itself on the free exchange of 
knowledge and information, as well as delve into the political economy of the Internet 
to establish who should be in control of specific intellectual properties.  Therefore, 
this research hopes to determine if there is still a place for intellectual property laws 
within a digitised culture, or if it has become obsolete within a global culture in which 
free knowledge collaboration is becoming the norm. 
 
In order to reach a conclusion surrounding this issue, four key questions need 
to be answered.  Firstly, it must be determined what the ethical implications involved 
within the formation of intellectual property rights are.  In answering this question, 
this dissertation will attempt to identify and explore general theories surrounding 
copyright ethics.  One should then be able to examine the general ethical issues 
surrounding information creation and its distribution, in terms of its role in the 
formulation of intellectual property rights. 
 
Secondly, this research will seek to answer what concerns there are regarding 
the ownership of knowledge within the digitised world.  Generally, the ownership of 
intellectual property is concerned with the control of information, rather than the 
possession of information itself, and so it is important to establish, through marketing 
theorists such as Tapscott et al (2005) and Friedman (2006), who can be accredited 
with the control of the political economy within the digitised environment.   
 
Thirdly, this research will investigate various collaborated videos found within 
the video sharing site YouTube, in order to determine if the use and manipulation of 
information is ethically sound in terms of intellectual property rights.  The ways in 
which users appropriate existing digital media to create their own digital media will 
be explored, and the ethics behind the ‘mashing together’ of various digital media to 
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create one’s own unique digital creation critically assessed.  Finally, after addressing 
each of the above issues, this research will attempt to answer its primary research 
question, and determine if there still is a place for intellectual property laws in 
cyberspace, and if so, to what extent they can play a role within an online world 
which promotes and facilitates the free exchange of knowledge and information. 
 
In order to answer these key questions, this research will concentrate on taking 
a qualitative approach, dealing with the conceptual analysis of intellectual property 
rights and ethical theory in terms of the mass collaboration of online digital 
information.  However, to give this research balance, it will require having to engage 
with a certain amount of empirical data.  Using selected videos from YouTube which 
highlight the practice of ‘digital mashing’, a form of textual analysis will be 
conducted in order to examine the issues surrounding the expropriation of digital 
images by YouTube users. 
 
The samples which will be discussed shall only include user videos which 
have been made up entirely of other mainstream media forms in order to conduct a 
comparative study between digital mashing and the original art forms.   This will help 
to determine to what extent these videos are infringing on intellectual property rights 
by consulting the appropriate territorial laws.  Samples will only feature South 
African and American users, thus allowing a comparative study to occur between the 
two countries, both in terms of content and of the respective national laws governing 
intellectual property.  This research will attempt to analyse the context in which a 
specific user has changed digital media into their own unique art form, and to what 
extent, if at all, such cases may have infringed traditional intellectual property law. 
 
However, as mentioned previously, this will only occur after a thorough 
conceptual analysis of general cyber-ethical theories.  These theories will be discussed 
in detail during the course of the following chapter.  This chapter, as an introductory 
literature review, will revolve around identifying and explaining critical theories and 
ideas that have been written about intellectual property rights, cyber-ethics, 
postmodern culture and the Internet, as well as focussing on the political economy of 
digital online culture.  Chapter 3 will concentrate on exploring and detailing the 
specific laws of South Africa and the United States, with regard to copyright law, 
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through a detailed analysis of each respective country’s copyright Acts in an attempt 
to ground this work in more practical terms, rather than remaining at a purely 
philosophical level of discussion.  This chapter will also expand on the information 
presented within Chapter 2, in regard to international policy concerning these two 
countries, in order to contextualise such activity within the territorial laws of the two 
selected countries. 
 
Chapter 4 then provides a deeper theoretical framework in order to 
contextualise the primary ideas introduced within Chapter 2, and outline how this 
research intends to utilise the latter information in conjunction with specific YouTube 
case studies.  Chapter 5 will outline the methodology, and determine how specific 
case studies were chosen from the YouTube site, in order to validate the contextual 
evidence presented within the previous three chapters.  This practical thrust is further 
endorsed by the inclusion of YouTube videos as case studies.  Chapter 6 will act as the 
discussion point for the results of the research.  This chapter will analyse each video 
individually, whilst simultaneously utilising the information discussed throughout the 
rest of the dissertation to validate and conclude the proposed research question – do 
copyright law needs to be revised within the newly emergent ‘prosumer’ online 
culture?  Finally, the concluding chapter will sum up the problems examined 
throughout this dissertation, and outline the results which have been achieved.  This 
final chapter will also suggest ways in which the concept of intellectual property 
online could be clarified and what steps, if any, should be taken in order to protect 
such property in the future.     
 
 
   
 








Chapter Two – Literature Review: 
 
 2.1 Introduction 
 
In order to confirm the proposed research question, one must address and 
understand the many facets of theory within the fields of media, ethics, and copyright 
law.  This chapter aims to discuss the most pertinent areas of writing which have been 
done in relation to these issues.  These concepts will form a versatile base from which 
to analyse the problems posed by this dissertation.  This chapter will discuss two key 
issues over three sections and eight sub-sections.  This section will discuss intellectual 
property rights.  Firstly, it will define what constitutes intellectual property as well as 
clarify various types of intellectual property in order to draw attention to copyright in 
particular.  Secondly, a brief overview of copyright law will be undertaken in order to 
establish the context of this research in terms of what is stipulated by individual 
countries and international conventions.  Finally, this section will contextualise 
intellectual property, copyright and the Internet within a historical perspective.  Only 
once it has been established how these subjects have evolved over time, will it be 
possible to determine how they should continue to evolve. 
 
The next section will consider the media in terms of political economy and 
globalisation.  Initially this section will discuss how the Internet has contributed 
toward the rise of a ‘prosumer’ culture, whereby users have become both producers 
and consumers of digital media.  This sub-section will also look at how this new 
emergent culture has affected the globalisation process and to what extent it has 
contributed to the global expansion of media.  This introduces the next sub-section, 
which discusses how the mass collaboration of knowledge and digital media are 
contributing to and/or detracting from a global public sphere.  This section then 
continues to investigate various ideas concerning the ownership and control of the 
knowledge economy online, in an attempt to determine how intellectual property 
online can be governed without disadvantaging new types of creative authors.  
 
The concluding section of this chapter will address ethics in terms of 
intellectual property and digital media.  It aims to discuss general ethical theory 
surrounding the role that creativity plays in the expansion of culture through 
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intellectual property, and what role ethics plays in formulating various forms of 
intellectual property rights.  This section also touches on the importance that free 
speech plays in the creative process and its necessity within the cyber-world.  The 
conclusion reached in this section should facilitate the analysis and formulation of the 
problem to be investigated in Chapter Three. 
 
 2.2 Intellectual Property Rights 
  2.2.1 Defining Intellectual Property 
 
Generally when one speaks about intellectual property there are three main 
branches with which it is associated: copyright, patents, and trademarks.  For one to 
adequately grasp the overall issues that this dissertation presents, it is of vital 
importance to clarify and define what constitutes intellectual property.  According to 
Cornish, “[i]ntellectual property protects applications of ideas and information that 
are of commercial value” (1989: 4).  However, there are many forms in which these 
ideas can appear, and so each specific format is in need of specific attention and 
protection.  While this dissertation is only focused on the field of copyright as a form 
of intellectual property, it is imperative that one is aware of other forms of intellectual 
property as well, in order to clarify what each specific branch of intellectual property 
constitutes, thus ensuring that there is no confusion. 
 
The problem with trying to separate various forms of intellectual property is 
that they often seem to overlap with one another, and at times, it becomes difficult to 
determine which form of intellectual property needs to be protected.  Trademarks, 
however, are perhaps the most unique of all intellectual property because they “have a 
less finite character than the information protected by patents, copyright and 
confidence” (Cornish, 1989: 391).  A trademark can be described as “any mark used 
or proposed to be used by a person in relation to goods or services for the purpose of 
distinguishing that person’s goods or services from those of another” (Viljoen et al, 
2000: 71); or in other words, a trademark is any unique “device, name, signature, 
word, letter, numeral, shape, configuration, pattern, ornamentation, colour, container 
for goods or any combination of these” (Viljoen et al, 2000: 72), with which a 
company or individual wants to be associated.  It therefore becomes the most easily 
distinguishable form of intellectual property because it becomes a symbol of specific 
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companies, with the general populace identifying a specific trademark with a specific 
company, preventing other companies from using a similar mark which may confuse 
this identification (Viljoen et al, 2000).  
 
As stipulated by Viljoen et al: 
 
The proprietor of a common law trademark is entitled to prevent another person from 
passing-off goods as being associated or connected, in the course of trade, with the 
proprietor or the proprietor’s goods.  In this regard, the proprietor has to prove two 
things: 
1) that he has used the mark to such an extent that he has acquired a reputation and 
goodwill in the mark 




However, one of the major concerns when considering trademarks is that at 
times, companies do not register them due to the assumption that their brand is well-
known (Viljoen at al, 2000).  This often occurs when “a trader has acquired the 
necessary reputation to succeed” (Viljoen et al, 2000: 72) within a market which they 
have yet to enter, as occurred in the late nineties, when McDonalds entered into the 
South African market for the first time (Viljoen et al, 2000).  At times this may seem 
contradictory to the law; however, a trademark need not be registered if the mark has 
become so intertwined with a company image that consumers cannot mistake that 
with which it is associated.  Subsequently, trademarks which are well-known can be 
protected “against the unauthorised use of a reproduction […] if the use is likely to 
cause deception or confusion to consumers” (Viljoen et al, 2000: 72).  Accordingly, 
trademarks can be manipulated and used by individuals, provided that it does not 
confuse the consumer into believing that it is associated with the specific company.  
However, this type of thinking cannot overflow into the other two branches of 
intellectual property.  
 
The protection of patents and copyright can be seen as far more tangible forms 
of intellectual property, primarily because they are not hypothetical symbols 
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associated with a brand or corporate ideal, but the protection of the manifestation of 
specific individual ideas.  Patents exist to “to give temporary protection to 
technological inventions and design rights to the appearance of mass-produced goods” 
(Cornish, 1989: 3).  In other words, a patent is the protection of ideas which act as the 
blueprints for formulas and designs of various inventions and discoveries, in order to 
grant a monopoly to the inventor of a specific design or invention.  However, whilst a 
patent gives the inventor a monopoly, it also encourages the sharing of a technology, 
in order to better society (Domanski, 1993).  Ultimately, society wants free use of an 
invention that allows it to move forward technologically, and this is achieved by 
allowing the inventor a monopoly for a limited period of time, after which the patent 
falls into the public domain, and can be used without restrictions by the greater public 
(Domanski, 1993).  Therefore, whilst simultaneously granting the inventor a period 
from which to profit from their work, patent law gives society the opportunity to 
benefit from the invention, without paying exorbitant fees by curtailing the inventor’s 
monopoly.     
 
Generally, an invention needs to fulfil three requirements to be registered as a 
patent; it must be novel, have some form of practical use, and be inventive 
(Domanski, 1993).  Firstly, for an invention to be novel and qualify for a patent 
application, it must be a new idea which has in no way been made available anywhere 
else in the world (Domanski, 1993).  Secondly, an invention must be useful in the 
sense that it works; it does not have to be the most practically useful tool for a specific 
job, but must function as it is prescribed to do (Domanski, 1993).  Finally, for 
something to be granted a patent, it must be inventive.  This is often the most common 
reason why a patent is not granted.  An invention needs to be something that a 
practitioner within the field for which it was made, has no prior knowledge of 
(Domanski, 1993).  It is also required to represent an advancement within a field, and 
not be an obvious solution to a problem (Domanski, 1993).  In other words, if a 
person, who is skilled in the area that an invention is aimed at is able to come to the 
same solution using their own common knowledge and intellect, it does not qualify 





2.2.2 Introducing and Defining Copyright 
 
Copyright is possibly one of the most fervently protected forms of intellectual 
property, and one of the most complicated in terms of the law.  It was formulated in 
order to protect the artistic creations of various intellectual authors, and to help ensure 
that authors were able to guarantee financial reward for their various works.  As 
defined by Cornish, “copyright [is] a practical expression of reverence for the act of 
artistic creation” (1989: 249), and as such, is something that deserves reward and 
protection.  Whilst many are under the impression that copyright is solely used as a 
way of protecting an author’s fiscal rights in terms of their artistic creations, it can 
also be seen as a way of protecting “the expression of an idea” (Cornish, 1989: 268), 
more than mere financial stability.  However, there is a number of ways in which an 
artistic work is determined to be in contention of copyright protection.  Cornish 
(1989) explains that the courts must determine if the work contains sufficient skill to 
warrant copyright fortification.  This standard is established in numerous ways, but 
mostly a work must contain a “distinctive element of creativity” (Cornish, 1989: 272) 
in order to gain copyright protection, an aspect which will be discussed further in 
Chapter 3. 
 
However, one of the major problems in terms of protecting the copyright of 
one’s intellectual property is that copyright is entirely territorial.  This means that 
copyright laws are completely dependent on the country of origin of each specific 
work (Cornish, 1989; De Villiers, 2000).  This has led to a number of international 
agreements being signed in an effort to help protect intellectual property within the 
global market.  The most important agreement known as the Berne Convention, 
formulated in the late 19th century, sought to establish “a multi-national system of 
equality” (Cornish, 1989: 249) in which members of the convention were able to 
secure protection under both their home country as well as other member countries.  
However, it has only been in the recent past that the United States has become a 
member state of the Berne Convention; and with many developing countries either not 
being members as of yet, or, in the case of those who are, being given special 
allowances to translate copyrighted works without corporate permissions, it has been 
difficult to give intellectual property adequate protection within the spectrum of the 
full global market. 
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Whilst first formulating the laws which aimed to protect copyright within the 
United States, the latter sought to “[underline] their independence from Britain by 
confining copyrights to citizens and residents” (Cornish, 1989: 249).  This helped to 
ensure that Americans were given proper protection for their works, whilst 
simultaneously encouraging artists who were not part of the United States to become 
citizens of the newly formed democracy.  Later, these ideals were re-formulated so as 
not to alienate foreign artists, and “Congress required all legitimate copies of various 
types of work to be produced in the United States” (Cornish, 1989: 249), rather than 
those works created exclusively by American citizens.  Recently though, the United 
States has joined alliances such as the Berne Convention and The Universal Copyright 
Convention so as to ensure that the works of their own nationals will be protected 
globally, whilst simultaneously offering the same rights to authors of other member 
states (Cornish, 1989).   
 
However, protecting copyright so fervently can be seen as problematic for 
developing countries.  Because developing countries require specific knowledge in 
order to develop their education and skills-based systems, they are required to publish 
and re-work intellectual property in a way that bridges the knowledge divide between 
themselves and the developed world.  But few developing countries are able to afford 
the high price involved in gaining legitimate reproduction rights of copyrighted works 
(Cornish, 1989).  By becoming global players and joining alliances such as the Berne 
Convention and The Universal Copyright Convention (UCC), developing countries 
are given protection, but are also required to adhere to global policies regarding 
intellectual property rights in terms of paying for the reproduction of works.  This has 
seen many developing nations refusing to join such agreements, and so intellectual 
property theft is rife within developing nations (Cornish, 1989). 
 
However, concessions have recently been made within these alliances, 
specifically aimed at assisting developing nations to bridge the knowledge divide.  It 
has been acknowledged that developing nations require many copyrighted works from 
the developed world in order to develop both their education systems and their 
economy, therefore “copyright was the first field of intellectual property in which the 
developing countries sought to have their needs recognised as a special case” 
(Cornish, 1989: 252): 
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The concessions in favour of developing countries were originally moulded into a 
Protocol to the Berne Convention at the Stockholm Revision in 1976 […] The 
Protocol allowed developing countries to reduce the term of copyright in their 
national law; to authorise translation into their national languages; to authorise 
publishing for educational and cultural purposes and to exclude from the scope of 
infringement reproduction for teaching, study or research; and to limit the scope of 
the right to broadcast. 
      (Cornish, 1989: 252-253) 
 
These concessions were, however, not supported by all member countries 
because it was thought that they were too lenient and could open the door to ‘legal 
piracy’, therefore this Protocol was revised to create two limitations on how and when 
a developing country was able to use these concessions: 
 
First, once three years have passed since first publication, a competent authority in 
the country may be empowered to license a national to translate a printed work into a 
national language, and publish it, for the purpose of teaching, scholarship or research; 
in the alternative, the country may take advantage of an older Convention provision 
allowing the termination of the translation rights, once 10 years from first publication 
have elapsed without the copyright owner publishing his own translation.  Secondly, 
if the copyright owner or an associate does not publish the work in a country within a 
set period after first publication, the competent authority can license a national to 
publish.  But the copies in both cases must be confined to the national market. 
       (Cornish, 1989: 253)   
 
This revision helped to ensure that developing countries were able to utilise 
copyrighted works without infringing on each author’s intellectual property rights, 
whilst at the same time guaranteeing an affordable way to benefit from these works.  
The most important clause, however, is the one guaranteeing that the translated copies 
to be utilised within a specific developing country, stay confined to that specific 
national market, thus ensuring that the author is not losing reward elsewhere.  
However, this type of protection is becoming more difficult to control with the 
constant increase in digital technology and the Internet.  It has become difficult to 
determine what borders to enforce as the global market is no longer defined by 
physical borders or nation-state governments.   
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As previously noted, the Berne and UCC Conventions seek to secure 
copyright protection for authors in both their home country and all other member 
countries which have signed these agreements (Cornish, 1989).  Because both South 
Africa and the United States are member states, they are each required to conform to 
the rules stipulated by these Conventions.  Therefore, to understand the copyright 
laws of each country, one must first identify the governing ideals formulated within 
these international agreements. 
 
Possibly the most “quintessential purpose of the Berne and UCC Conventions 
is to secure the principle of national treatment: the works of authors connected with 
any one member state and to receive the same copyright under the law of each other 
member state as do the work of authors connected with the latter state” (Cornish, 
1989: 279).  While it has been established that copyright law is entirely territorial in 
nature, the ideals stipulated within these agreements, highlight how many countries 
are beginning to conform to the same basic ideas concerning copyright.  Perhaps due 
to the changing nature of the global economy, copyright law will eventually become a 
wholly international agreement instead of national law.  This idea is already evident 
when one considers that member states of the Berne Convention have all written into 
national law that the classic form “of copyright is the author’s life and 50 years 
thereafter” (Cornish, 1989: 283). 
 
  2.2.3 A History of Online Intellectual Property Rights 
 
As the Internet has evolved from its inception during the eighties and early 
nineties as a public information system, so have the ideas surrounding intellectual 
property online.  The Internet was initially designed during the seventies as a 
“decentralised routing system […] to carry messages from point to point even if 
intermediate communication exchanges [were] blocked, damaged, or destroyed” 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006: 3).  The main premise on which the Internet was built, 
encouraged the free-flow of information between users, as a way in which to disperse 
knowledge openly and to communicate easily and affordably with one another 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  However, the effect that this type of communication had 
on those who sought to protect intellectual property rights after the Internet went 
public in the early nineties, was unforeseen (Bowyer, 1995). 
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Firstly, because of the ease with which information can be communicated and 
copied, “anything that anyone has come up with in virtual reality can be infinitely 
reproduced” (Tribe, 1997: 214).  However, whilst this is true of the Internet, the 
infringement of intellectual property was far more easily monitored during the early 
part of the Internet’s development than it is today, partly due to the Internet being 
used by a far smaller number of people, and partly because of the simplistic nature of 
the Internet when compared to the array of online features available today (Rose, 
1997).  It was well-known that those who infringed upon copyright would face severe 
legal action, consequently discouraging “organised copyright infringement, […] 
especially infringements out in the open” (Rose, 1997: 222).  While one could argue 
that only large piracy sites were targeted fairly easily by copyright enforcers due to 
their size, one could also assume that individual infringers were protected due to the 
anonymity that the Internet provided.  However, during this period, as Rose has 
described it, “anonymous infringements [would] arc across the Net like shooting stars, 
and disappear from sight just as quickly.  Those who [wanted] the latest freebie 
[would] have to scramble for it before the cops and their software agents [went] out to 
sweep up the mess” (1997: 223), because most were too scared to face the expensive 
legal teams of the large corporations which represented creative artists and authors. 
 
Therefore, whilst writers and researchers believed that even though the 
Internet was an environment in which copyright could be infringed upon quite easily, 
it was still possible to protect creative works through thorough legal action against 
infringers.  In 2003, the recording industry finally reacted to their diminishing control 
over music sales, and embarked on a mass prosecution of individual illegal 
downloaders.  One of the most famous documented cases was that of “Brianna 
LaHara, a twelve year old girl, who was sued for several hundred thousand dollars for 
downloading songs like, If You’re Happy and You Know It Clap Your Hands” 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006: 115) .  While corporations knew that they would not be able 
to prosecute every illegal downloader, they believed that legal actions, such as that 
taken against LaHara, would help marginalise the society which partook in the 
practice, in an attempt to lessen the number of users participating in illegal 
downloading.  However, there were still other aspects which creative artists had to 
contend with in terms of their works being openly shared and used amongst online 
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users.  One such area was the development of the GNU operating system during the 
latter part of the eighties.   
 
The GNU software system was designed with the sole intention of providing 
online users with a free operating system that was openly collaborated on and freely 
shared online (Stallman, 1997), consequently epitomising the original ideals of 
software distribution amongst the founders of the Internet.  The basic premise behind 
the GNU software system was that it allowed users to download the operating 
system’s software and be “permitted to modify and redistribute GNU, but no 
distributor [was] allowed to restrict its further redistribution” (Stallman, 1997: 231).  
Therefore, GNU was open-source software that allowed users the opportunity to 
collaborate, and make changes that would advance the usability of the software, on 
condition that if one was to contribute to the collaboration, one was firstly not able to 
profit from their contribution, and secondly, that one was satisfied with other users 
manipulating and building onto their advancement. 
 
Critics of GNU stipulated that the reason software programmes had to be 
bought and sold, and the copyright of such programmes protected, was that designers 
and programmers deserved to be rewarded for their creativity and efforts of design, 
and more importantly, that those that worked on such programmes had a right to 
control how their creativity was used (Stallman, 1997).  However, as pointed out by 
Stallman in “The GNU Manifesto”, “‘[c]ontrol over the use of one’s ideas’ really 
constitutes control over other people’s lives” (1997: 235), and invariably copyright is 
a relatively modern practice without much historical support.  If one looks at history, 
ancient scholars would copy vast amounts of each other’s works in order to both build 
on their findings, as well as ensure that their work was in part preserved as long as 
possible (Stallman, 1997).   
 
So in essence, copyright protection in terms of early digital technology was 
under constant pressure from various software designers, who believed that online 
software and creativity should be openly shared with one another, in an attempt to 
bolster the development of online technologies, and as a way of creating a virtual 
world of camaraderie amongst users (Stallman, 1997).  Problematically, during this 
period, efforts by authorities to monitor those users who engaged in the unlawful 
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distribution and display of various copyrighted works online, were often undermined 
by many of the architects of the Internet.  These programmers and designers were 
intent on fulfilling “the Internet’s founding vision of an open, non-commercial 
network run by selfless experts for the benefit of all” (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006: 30).  
However, what made copyright even more difficult to protect online during the early 
days of the Internet, was a feature that is still perplexing intellectual property rights 
activists today: the realisation that the Internet is without borders, and consequently 
one is unsure of which laws to follow. 
 
As has already been discussed, copyright is an entirely territorial law, and 
therefore falls under the jurisdiction of the specific country in which a work 
originates.  This has been a difficult issue to overcome, and one which is still ongoing.  
However, “[i]n the late 1990’s, there was broad agreement that the Internet’s 
challenge to government’s authority would diminish the nation-state’s relevance” 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006: 3).  Because of the simplicity of the Internet at that time, 
Internet service providers (ISPs) and Internet hosts were unable to identify where in 
the world many of their users were from, and thus had little ability to control their 
actions in terms of copyright infringement due to each country having a different 
stance on what constitutes copyright theft (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  Therefore, what 
has emerged due to the ubiquity of the Internet is the idea that the territorial laws 
governing copyright, need to be “supplemented, and eventually replaced, by global 
governmental institutions” (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006: 25).  This has been achieved, in 
part, with the signing of the Berne Convention as mentioned previously in this 
chapter.  However, what was seen to be a problem was the realisation, during this 
deliberation period, that “due to the widely varying ethical and legal standards among 
cultures, as well as [the] sharp differences between lesser developed and more 
developed countries” (Bowyer, 1996: 257), it would be difficult to determine which 
countries’ ideals, with respect to intellectual property, should become the global 
norm.   
 
Two important advancements have been made since the mid-nineties which 
have somewhat eased this problem.  Firstly, with the invention and introduction of 
Google came the technology to determine where in the world a user was from, in an 
attempt to directly market toward users’ individual niche tastes (Goldsmith & Wu, 
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2006).  Therefore, Internet service providers and Internet hosts no longer had the 
excuse that they could not determine where a user was from, and so could not 
determine which law they should be following.  Secondly, and possibly the most 
important advancement, was the introduction during the early 2000’s of the Web 2.0 
(Friedman, 2006).  The Web 2.0 introduced users to a far more interactive and user-
friendly Internet, in which users were able to send larger files far faster and more 
cheaply than ever before (Tapscott & Williams, 2005).  The invention of fibre-optic 
cables, which have quickened the informational exchange when compared to the dial-
up connections of the past, has allowed companies the opportunity to spread globally 
into untapped markets, collaborating easily from one continent to the next, quickly 
and efficiently (Tapscott & Williams, 2005).  However, what is just as pertinent to 
this research, is that these technological advancements have also led to users actively 
producing and consuming their own digital content, which can be hosted online for 
other users to interact with at little or no cost at all, resulting in the rise of a somewhat 
unified global ‘prosumer’ culture (Marshall, 2004). 
  
2.3  Online Culture and the Ethics of Mass Collaboration 
2.3.1 The Rise of Postmodernity, Globalisation and the ‘Prosumer’ 
Culture 
 
Within the last few decades, the Internet has evolved into a more user-friendly 
environment, and has, in so doing, propelled the rise of Internet usage by companies 
and individuals around the world (Friedman, 2006).  The expansion of new media 
technology has given users an unsurpassed gateway to different world cultures, as 
well as the opportunity to communicate faster and more efficiently than was ever 
thought possible a few decades ago.  It has always been an historical fact that cultures 
grow and change through interaction with one another; however, it has never seemed 
to move as quickly as it is doing during the current information age (Gupta & 
Ferguson, 1992; Castells, 2004).  Due to this, many writers are indicating that the 
world is developing a type of hybrid culture, in which societies are adopting a more 
Westernised view of culture through the use of modern media technologies (Castells, 
2004; Friedman, 2006; Flew & McElhinney, 2002). 
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According to Mark Poster (2008), hybridity has in large part been a result, 
firstly, of media being distributed globally, and its interaction with varying cultures 
around the world; the resultant media being a merger of local culture, and Western 
culture.  Secondly, he argues that mass migrancy of people around the globe has also 
played a large role toward influencing the way in which traditional cultures are being 
formulated.  He explains that “contemporary migrants maintain multiple, partial 
commitments to their adopted location but also to the land of their origins” (Poster, 
2008: 697), and one of the most pertinent ways in which migrants are able to do this, 
are through the systems of new media.  This is further supported by Gupta and 
Ferguson (1992: 10), who describe that the increasing diaspora of cultures, and the 
mass movement of populations, can no longer be mapped by geographical boundaries 
because these attempts “are bewildered by a dazzling array of postcolonial 
simulacra”.   Consequently, this combined with globalisation, stops cultural products 
and practices from cementing themselves in one specific territory, erasing any true 
forms of geographically territorial roots or places (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992). 
 
As Flew & McElhinney (2002: 304) have also stipulated, globalisation has 
occurred for a number of reasons, including: 
 
• the rise of Internet-based electronic commerce; 
• international communication flows, delivered through 
telecommunications, information and media technologies such as 
broadband cable, satellite and the Internet, which facilitate 
transnational circulation of commodities, texts, images and 
artefacts; 
• the global circulation of ideas, ideologies and ‘keywords’, such as 
the so-called export of ‘Western values’, democratic aspirations or 
environmental consciousness; and 
• the establishment of international regimes in intellectual property 




Therefore, one can conclude that a major factor contributing toward 
globalisation is the role played by media technologies.  However, what has also 
resulted from the expansion of media technology and globalisation is the rise of the 
‘prosumer’ culture (Marshall, 2004).  It has already been stipulated that the Internet 
can be seen as a tool which is threatening the role of traditional laws of many nation-
states.  But one can also note that “global media are seen as playing [a part] in the 
cultural weakening of the bonds which tie people to nation-states” (Flew & 
McElhinney, 2002: 305).  The borderless nature of the Internet, and the ability it 
offers users to transcend spatial and temporal limits, has helped to develop a culture 
of online users who are actively engaging in both the consumption and production of 
this technology (Marshall, 2004).  As Tapscott and Williams put it, “this new 
generation of prosumers treats the world as a place for creation, not consumption” 
(2006: 127), indicating how media is no longer a one-way process, but an instrument 
to be manipulated and designed specifically by each individual user for each of their 
own unique online experiences.  In doing so, the new emergent politics of global 
culture not only loosens its control of the nation-state as a cultural centre, but also 
assists in producing “more individualizing, multiple figures of the self” (Poster, 2008: 
697). 
 
Users now often take existing online media and adapt it to their own personal 
tastes and designs, thus becoming indicative of the complex nature of the postmodern 
self, in which individuals are seen to be layered, inventive, and active within their 
everyday practice (Poster, 2008).  This was originally met with resistance from large 
corporations, who viewed this as a breach of intellectual property rights, but it has 
slowly become the norm for companies to offer products which can be customised by 
individual buyers (Tapscott & Williams, 2006).  What results is that “people who 
stretch the limits of existing technology and often create their own product prototypes 
in the process – often develop modifications and extensions to products that will 
eventually appeal to mainstream markets” (Tapscott & Williams, 2006: 128).  This 
type of development and culture, therefore, has large benefits for companies who gain 
valuable developmental ideas on products, without having to invest time or money in 
a product’s creation.  This “deployment of new communication technologies offers 
new social movements […] in particular through the radicalisation of production, to a 
degree not seen in previous manifestations of social-movement media” (Atton, 2007: 
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63).  What can be noted is the progression of a global social movement toward the 
collaboration and distribution of knowledge and creativity, rather than the strict 
control and limitation of ideas that has occurred in terms of intellectual property rights 
protection of the past.  As Atton suggests, it is “these initiatives, in their intertwining 
and redefining of media forms, in their blurring of creator, producer and distributor, 
[which have resulted in the] hybridised forms of media production particularly well 
suited to the multimedia possibilities of the Internet and the World Wide Web” (2007: 
65). 
 
Importantly, it is the culture of ‘prosumers’ which are challenging the old 
assumption that “information must move from credentialed producers to passive 
consumers” (Tapscott & Williams, 2006: 146).  Online users have redefined the 
meaning of an active audience, with users no longer being limited merely to consume 
and react, waiting for producers to change media to those reactions.  What one is 
seeing in today’s online media landscape are users who actively change what they do 
not like about media to suit their own preferences; users are becoming the media 
(Tapscott & Williams, 2006). 
 
 2.3.2 Postmodern Identity 
 
Throughout the course of the 20th century, society has continually been 
developing and evolving into a more visually aware culture.  Beginning with the 
development of photography, which allowed the working class population the 
opportunity to actively construct the identity they wished to portray to larger society, 
one could see the slow emergence of this visual culture (Swanepoel, 2005).  With 
each new development within the media, new practices of representation have 
emerged, and so too have the ways in which one creates their identity.  Today the 
Internet offers a revolutionary way of creating identity, least of which is the 
opportunity to play with and construct not only one, but an endless multitude of 
identities. 
 
Initially the Internet was characterised by user anonymity, an aspect which led 
to extensive research being conducted in order to establish and understand the role 
that this played within the formation of online identity.  As Nancy Baym puts it: “the 
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reduction of physical appearance cues […] opens the potential for a multiplicity of 
identities, a high degree of privacy, and a lower sense of social risk” (2002: 64); 
subsequently users felt more comfortable expressing various aspects of themselves 
online, due to the anonymity which was offered by the Internet.  But with the advent 
of a more visual Internet and a greater number of users using it to further offline 
social relationships through social networking sites, such as YouTube and Facebook, 
much of the anonymity associated with user identification has fallen away.  However, 
this type of identity formation has paved the way for an “increasingly rapid pace of 
social structure and cultural change [in] which it becomes increasingly difficult to 
construct stable identities” (Levine, 2005: 175).  
 
Manuell Castells defines identity as the process of internalising and making 
meaning from the roles that we play within society.  Every person in society plays a 
number of roles which help to order the function of each individual within different 
social situations (Castells, 2004); however, it is only when a person internalises a role 
in order to make meaning of it, does it become an aspect of their identity.  This 
implies that whilst individuals are required to act out a specific role within certain 
social situations, it does not reflect upon a person’s identity unless they feel that it is a 
part of what defines them, and ultimately that they internalise that role into their 
being.  However, with this said, it is also important to recognise that no identity is 
fixed, and it is constantly changing based on a person’s interactions within different 
social circles.  As Charles Levine (2005) indicates, identity formation is an on-going, 
life-long process which is always in a state of flux, continually being constructed, 
broken down, and re-constructed.  
 
Due to this constant state of fluidity, identities are thought not only to change, 
continuously adapting, but that also due to the multitude of roles that must be 
navigated, multiple identities have started to emerge in order to adapt.  As such, one 
can note that “the task of acquiring and maintaining coherent identities has become 
increasingly difficult” (Levine, 2005: 175).  Zymaut Bauman (2004: 15) speculates 
that because of this, identity needs to be thought of “as something to be invented 
rather than discovered”.  Not only do individuals construct identities based on 
different social situations, but also on different cultural attributes (Castells, 1996; 
Levine, 2005).  Therefore, this recognises that one cannot only look at how identities 
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are personally invented, but simultaneously how they are socially determined as well.  
Identity is therefore the internalisation of social roles that help to make sense about a 
person’s place in the world, based on their personal cultural ideas, as well as the those 
ideals which are deemed important by society.  Because society and culture change 
continually over time, individuals have become “forced to twist and mould [their] 
identities” (Bauman, 2004: 90) in order to make sense of their place in the world. 
 
In the early 1990s, Internet users began utilising the virtual space of the online 
as an arena in which to create alternate social networks known as Multi-User 
Domains (MUDs).  MUDs allowed users the opportunity to create their own unique 
identities with which to interact online due to the lack of physical presence (Turkle, 
1995).  During this period, the Internet was primarily text-based and users were 
required to create identities through language and without any form of visual cues 
(Baym, 2002).  It has been determined, by theorists such as Sherry Turkle, that 
individuals began creating different identities within the online world as a way in 
which to create meaning and find a distinct place for themselves within this landscape 
(1995).  It is also possibly to associate the formation of identity online as a way in 
which to “experiment with other parts of ourselves, take risks or express aspects of 
our self that we find impossible to live out” (Lister et al, 2003: 167) in the offline 
world.  However, the MUDs of the past have also been linked to assisting in the 
preservation and strengthening of identity (Castells, 1996).  This has stemmed from 
the belief , as already mentioned, that identity is no longer a stable entity with clear-
cut boundaries created by the individual, but instead is an ever-changing aspect of 
oneself controlled by the commodification of society.  Mark Poster acknowledges that 
“the virtual invokes the ethical duty to maintain one’s identity” (2006: 153) and so 
online identity is assumed as a way in which to gain back some control over the 
creation of one’s identity. 
 
Within a postmodern context, identity is seen as highly fragmented due to the 
many roles that individuals assume within the many social and cultural forms of 
today’s society.  The variety of social and cultural forms that individuals are 
confronted with seems to have stemmed largely from globalisation.  As a variety of 
cultures and societies are brought together through telecommunications, media, and 
trade, so people are engulfed and more regularly involved with cultures and societies 
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that, in the past, they would normally not have been aware of (Marshall, 2004).  This 
has contributed to the fragmentation of identities as individuals try to find a place in 
this highly global society and in so doing create a number of identities on order to 
adapt and make meaning of their place within it. 
 
In conjunction with globalisation, the commodification of culture must also be 
looked at in terms of the postmodern society.  Frederic Jameson (1991) identified that 
within the postmodern context, identity is no longer made up of a coherent historical 
process whereby an individual uses their past social knowledge to affect their present 
and build their future.  Instead, within a postmodern society one experiences the 
commodification of the historical in order to shape society and an individual’s 
thinking of a specific time.  In other words, people are influenced in terms of specific 
temporal aspects of culture based on the way in which it is commodified and 
marketed; consequently, people are no longer seen to construct their identity around a 
coherent past, but rather from a commodification of aspects from a variety of times.  
As such, Jameson describes that identity formation within the new postmodern social 
context no longer depends on the traditional, and historical formulation of society 
through “the omnipresence of class struggle” (1991: 190), but instead one is required 
“to seek History by way of our own pop images and simulacra” (1991: 193). 
 
Firstly, this concept highlights why identity within postmodernity is 
fragmented, as it forces one to “share marginalised relational, rather than either taken-
for-granted or merely given identities” (Zelechow, 2004: 80), whereby one’s identity 
was established based on one’s birth within the social hierarchy.  Secondly, it draws 
attention to the notion that identity is now, more than ever, established “in relation to 
otherness actualized in persons and culture in the sacred time of existence” 
(Zelechow, 2004: 79).   In other words, identity is that which organises one’s relations 
to the social world.  As such, Zelechow (2004: 193) explains that the shift in the way 
identity is formulated has marked the “end of the distinctive individual brush stroke” 
as individuals are required to internalise a variety of “norms” which help to justify the 





  2.3.3 The Public Sphere and Mass Collaboration 
 
Many have proclaimed that the Internet is the new public sphere, because it 
gives users the opportunity to interact within “an open forum in which ideas can 
generally be communicated freely and easily” (Tavani, 2004: 289).  The Internet has 
been built upon the presumption that it is an environment that embodies “the 
principles of free speech, individualism, equality, and open access” (Jankowski, 2002: 
39).  Therefore, the Internet can be seen as the foundation that has assisted in the 
emergence of a multitude of online communities.  These communities group like-
minded individuals together in an attempt to collaborate and share information that 
they deem to be important, and, “as a result of [these] technological developments 
[…] contemporary life is a swirling sea of social relations (Gergen, 1997: 138). 
 
Drawing on the theories of Jürgen Habermas, Marshall highlights that the 
public sphere was first visualised as the “conceptualization of sites for the 
development of a public discussion” (2004: 52), in which bourgeois society could 
debate and discuss various issues concerning public interest.  Neo-liberal political 
philosophy argues that the Internet “has found a comfortable berth in an intellectual 
stream of postmodern thought that denies the possibility of an institutionalised 
representation of common or collective interests” (Gandy, 2002: 449), thus indicating 
that the Internet is a completely open forum for individual creativity which cannot be 
cordoned off by the traditional controlling forces of society.  Therefore, it can be 
argued that what has resulted from the introduction of the Internet, is a much purer 
form of the public sphere, and one which ultimately captures Habermas’ vision of an 
idealised public sphere which was “thought to be a fundamental resource for the 
evolution and growth of democracy” (Gandy, 2002: 449).  Consequently, what can be 
noted is that emerging Internet culture is a highly discursive and interactive 
environment which “is valued for its role in the development of public will and its 
expression [of] public opinion” (Gandy, 2002: 449). 
 
This idea is further supported by many non-democratic, foreign governments 
investing millions into surveillance, and limiting what many of their citizens are able 
to access (Friedman, 2006).  China is just one of many countries which monitor, and 
restrict, both the content used and the content produced by Internet users within their 
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borders.  In 2002, the Chinese government arrested Liu Di, a university student, for 
hosting a website which criticised the fundamental workings of the Chinese state.  
When other Chinese users protested her arrest, the Chinese government swiftly 
arrested a further five people.  She was charged with promoting material detrimental 
to state security, forced to serve a year prison sentence, and is now subject to a life of 
constant surveillance with no opportunity to leave the city of Beijing (Goldsmith & 
Wu, 2006).   While this case demonstrates the power that governments can have over 
users’ interactions online, it more importantly indicates that users have the ability to 
freely and openly discuss, and criticise the society in which they reside.  Governments 
are fearful because not only do they face the possibility of the decline of the nation 
state, but also a decline in the laws which keep the nation state intact, and as has been 
discussed previously, is resulting in the “emergence of a new form of ‘global 
citizenship’” (Gandy, 2002: 450).  However, the idea of a new, almost utopian public 
sphere can be seen as somewhat problematic.  Gandy highlights that “the movement 
into what we refer to as an information age has also been shaped in large part by the 
transformation of information into a commodity” (2002: 450).  
 
In the past, the public sphere was seen as an environment in which the citizen 
was able critically to discuss society, while in conjunction with the idea that 
information has become a commodity, critics have indicated that the problem with the 
Internet and new media in general, is that it is “widening the distinction between the 
citizen and the consumer” (Gandy, 2002: 448).  The Internet cannot be deemed the 
ideal new public sphere because one cannot gauge users as citizens, but rather as 
consumers: as previously mentioned, Internet users have become both producers and 
consumers of digital content.  The work of Jean Baudrillard has highlighted the idea 
of the hyper-real, in which an environment becomes “a play of illusions and 
phantasms” (1988: 169).  It is the idea of a hyper-real atmosphere that has inspired 
writers such as Gandy to describe the Internet as a public sphere which “[shifts] away 
from engagement with serious topics toward an emphasis on sensationalism and 
escapist fare” (2002: 452).  Thus the Internet becomes a contentious arena, in which 
one finds it difficult to separate the concerned citizen aiming to better society, and the 
consumer who seeks reward for the skill and creativity which guides them through the 
never-ending hyper-links of the online world, consequently observing that “the 
division between the realm governed by citizens or members of society and the realms 
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governed by consumers in markets is widened by the wedge of information 
technology” (Gandy, 2002: 450). 
 
Apart from the difficulty arising in distinguishing between the citizen and the 
consumer, one is also faced with the reality that the Internet encourages users to 
create their own unique digital experience (Tavani, 2004).  If one was not faced with 
the reality that users have become consumers rather than critical citizens, another 
issue that questions the validity of equating the Internet as the new public sphere, 
arises from the fact that users actively choose what they wish to engage in.  Rather 
than be faced with new and alternate social views which could broaden users’ 
understanding, most would rather create an online environment which reinforces and 
confirms their existing prejudices (Tavani, 2004).  No user has to engage or 
acknowledge any viewpoint that does not match their own; and so one could argue 
that instead of creating the idealised public sphere that Habermas first envisioned as 
originating in the late 18th century, in which individual citizens discussed a variety of 
social issues openly and freely, the Internet is actually creating a somewhat closed-
minded culture in which users only engage with other like-minded individuals.    
 
However, whilst this may seem to be true to some extent, one must also be 
aware that through the combination of like-minded individuals, one has the 
opportunity to create, discuss, and continue to develop those areas which interest them 
(Gandy, 2002).  Importantly, the participation within these groups “involves reference 
to personal experience, and discussions involve the reformation and interpretation of 
information provided by traditional mainstream media” (Gandy, 2002: 455).  
Therefore, one’s interaction within these groupings assists in the sharing and 
collaboration of individual knowledge, which has been acquired through traditional 
media forms as a way in which to further understanding of various issues, resulting in 
the mobilisation of a social collective which “will come together to build a new global 
public sphere” (Gandy, 2002: 458). 
 
Apart from building a new public sphere, this interaction can also be viewed 
as creating a new type of social culture.  Within the last century, the visual image has 
dominated our views regarding society, ranging from the saturation of advertising, 
magazines, movies, television, and the Internet.  As such, Rosemary Coombe (1998: 
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50) has argued that society’s collective sense of reality “owes as much to the media as 
it does to the direct observation of events and natural phenomena”.  As such, this 
supports aspects of postmodern culture, in which the plethora of mass-mediated 
imagery assists in creating a culture not confined by geographical communities, but 
instead by an ever-expanding world of signs and symbols which only have meaning 
within the globalised spectrum of the online public sphere (Coombe, 1998).         
 
2.3.4  The Political Economy versus the Knowledge Economy:   
          Who is In Control? 
 
One of the most pertinent areas of discussion that has emerged since the 
advent of the Web 2.0, is that is has the ability to undermine traditional institutions of 
power, through its user-friendly and continually expansive interactive features 
(Webster, 2002; Stein & Sinha, 2002; Verhulst, 2002; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  
There are growing fears among critics of the Internet, that because of these qualities, 
traditional power relations will be eroded in favour of an anarchist cyber-world, in 
which users will fervently dismiss those laws which have helped to protect intellectual 
authors for the past few centuries.   Stefan Verhulst describes how “the locus of power 
has shifted from the service or content provider to the user, creating a many-to-many 
communications environment” (2002: 435).  In addition to this, the seemingly 
borderless nature of the Internet is making it increasingly difficult for governments to 
govern and protect those areas of law dealing with intellectual copyright.  However, 
there are a number of arguments which contradict this statement, and it is necessary to 
explore what, if anything, has changed in terms of intellectual property control online, 
when compared to its control within the analogous world prior to the Net. 
 
During the early part of the twentieth century, Edwin Howard Armstrong 
invented one of the most fundamental tools in radio broadcasting, that of FM radio.  
At the time, he was employed by the Radio Corporation of America (RCA), which 
was the main powerhouse company behind the then dominant form of AM radio.  
Armstrong was commissioned to invent something that would help remove the static 
of AM and create a more clarified listening-experience; instead, he developed FM, 
which utilised a far broader frequency spectrum than afforded by AM.  As a result, 
the RCA viewed his invention as a threat to their dominance within the broadcasting 
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market and the president of the corporation, David Sarnoff, tried to curtail the 
introduction of FM because, as Lessig (2004: 5) notes, if FM was “allowed to develop 
unrestrained, [it] posed a complete reordering of radio power and the eventual 
overthrow of the carefully restricted AM system on which [the] RCA had grown to 
power”.  Unfortunately for Armstrong, most of the world were distracted by World 
War II and did not notice the way in which the RCA worked with the Federal 
Communications Commission (FCC) to “assign spectrum in a way that would castrate 
FM” (Lessig, 2004: 5). 
 
One of the ways in which this was achieved was by restricting FM radio 
producers the right to transmit signal between different parts of the country.  This 
endeavour was further supported by the American Telephone and Telegraph 
Company (AT&T) which benefited from the loss of radio relaying FM stations as FM 
broadcasters were now required to buy wired links from AT&T to maintain their 
transmissions.  All of these factors helped to curb the expansion of FM radio for a 
number of years, and as a result, Armstrong was never able to defend his patent for 
the technology, and ultimately never rewarded for his work – he committed suicide 
after being offered a settlement which did not even cover his legal fees in his patent 
quest (Lessig, 2004).  This example demonstrates that intellectual property, whilst 
theoretically designed to protect creators, is often at the mercy of those who are 
dominant players within society.  The individual creation of intellectual property is 
often not rewarded or protected unless it is seen as propagating some form of 
advantage for those already in power.  That which challenges the status quo of 
financial powerhouses is often stunted and undermined in an attempt for dominant 
forces to maintain their superiority.  However, as previously mentioned, many critics 
claim that the Internet gives creators the opportunity to by-pass this control, and for 
the first time one is able to challenge the established norms of the traditional status 
quo.   
 
This raises two important issues which need to be examined.  Firstly, one must 
explore the concerns that a borderless world raises, and secondly, whether the 
knowledge economy of the Internet is really relinquishing power to the common user.  
As has been mentioned previously, copyright is a territorial law which is controlled by 
each individual nation state, and as Andrés González has indicated, places nation-state 
 30
governments in the precarious position of “putting a leash on the chaotic and anarchic 
nature of cyberspace” (2007: 1298).  This seems to negate the idea of the Internet 
becoming a new form of the public sphere, open to the free distribution of knowledge 
and ideas.  Governments around the world have attempted a mass clamp-down on the 
exchange of intellectual property online, even striking deals with search engines such 
as Google to block specific links which lead users to sites which could be viewed as 
harmful to the protection of copyright (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  A recent example of 
this, is the blocking a number of custom search functions which have been utilised by 
torrent tracker sites (Masnick, 2009).  These sites assist users in finding torrents: files 
which have been split into a number of pieces over a number of servers, in order to 
break large files into smaller ones, helping to decrease download times.  Users then 
use torrent software to interpret these smaller pieces of data, putting them back 
together and making up a coherent whole file.  This is especially useful for those users 
who wish to download movies or games which often take hours to download due to 
their sheer size.  However, torrent technology breaks these files into smaller, more 
manageable files, which take mere minutes to download and re-structure back into 
full movies and games; therefore making the process of sharing this information far 
quicker than would generally occur without the introduction of torrent software.  By 
preventing users from finding these sites, Google has taken a step toward assisting 
copyright authorities stop mass illegal sharing and downloading.       
 
However, one of the most difficult battles that governments have been faced 
with is the rise of peer-to-peer sharing networks, whereby users share various media 
forms found within their personal hard drives within virtual online platforms.  This is 
done by “indexing sites [informing] sharers of what is available, [then] client 
programs search the hard disks of other users to obtain copies” (Poster, 2008: 693), 
thus allowing users to share information peer-to-peer.  The most famous of these 
networks was Napster, which found notoriety in the late nineties amongst record 
labels (Vaidhyanathan, 2001; Friedman, 2006; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; Tehranian, 
2007).  Shawn Fanning revolutionised the way in which users could share information 
with the design of his peer-to-peer sharing programme known as Napster.  This 
programme allowed users to search, and copy media files from the hard drives of 
other users who had also downloaded the Napster programme, creating a network of 
consensual mass file-sharing (Tapscott & Williams, 2005).  Sharing, and copying 
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music has always been a common occurrence; however, this network, most popular 
with university and high school students, allowed an easier way for music to be 
shared with one another, on a much larger scale, and without actually having to buy 
anything.   Record labels and copyright enforcers saw this not as a revolutionary way 
of sharing knowledge, as many Internet enthusiasts did, but instead as a mass act of 
piracy, which could lead to the mass downfall of the music industry (Vaidhyanathan, 
2001; Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  After all, why would one pay for music if it was 
possible to download and share it free of charge online?   
 
This led to mass legal action in the late nineties, by record labels and various 
copyright authorities, to shut down file-sharing sites, and prosecute those users who 
actively participated on these sites (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  After all, artists were 
protected by copyright to ensure that they were sufficiently rewarded for their works, 
and protected “against those who would steal the fruits of their efforts” (Rønning et 
al, 2006: 6).  However, critics of this approach, argue that the original ideals 
regulating copyright protection have been eroded (Rønning et al, 2006; Woker, 2006; 
Goldsmith & Wu, 2006; González, 2007).  Copyright, as with any regulatory regime, 
aims to “create a balance between the rights of creators and the needs of society to be 
able to develop both culturally and economically (Woker, 2006: 36); and if 
implemented correctly, copyright does achieve this.  But because of the freedom 
which the Internet allows in the transmission and sharing of intellectual property, 
protectors of copyright have somewhat stifled those ideals of copyright which were 
implemented to create a balance between the rights of the public and creators 
(Rønning et al, 2006). 
 
Originally, many thought that the empowerment that the Internet allows users, 
would shift the control of copyright from large institutions to that of the user 
(Verhulst, 2002); and the seeming panic that emerged among copyright authorities 
with the introduction of file-sharing programmes such as Napster, and the quick 
action taken to shut these services down, assisted in validating these views.  However, 
recent study has shown that this is not the case. Quite the opposite in fact has emerged 
within Internet technology (Wirtén, 2004; Pistorius, 2006; González, 2007).  Artists, 
publishers, and intellectual property authorities are making it more and more difficult 
for the common public to access and share copyrighted works illegally in digital 
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format.  Apart from prosecuting and shutting down any sites that are found to contain 
or distribute copyrighted works illegally, publishers and record labels began to install 
‘locks’ on much of the digital content that they produced.  These ‘locks’ were able to 
monitor and limit what users did with the various copyrighted works that they bought 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  One such product is the Apple I-Pod which is locked to 
recognise and play only a specific music file type, a file type which is only compatible 
with the I-Pod itself.  Therefore, users who do not buy legitimate music from Apple’s 
I-Tunes’ download site, have to convert their MP3 files through a specialised I-Tunes’ 
programme, which is able to monitor the sources of users’ various MP3 files 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). 
      
Whilst this may seem unethical in terms of privacy laws, it is not unethical for 
Apple to restrict access to their products through encryption, as many consumers 
believe.  Most users seem to be unaware that even when they buy specific media 
forms, they do not own that information, and therefore feel that they may share and 
re-distribute the material which they have bought (Woker, 2006).  In reality, one is 
only buying the licence to view and use that information for private use: 
 
 
A licence is the means whereby the owner can obtain remuneration by permitting 
another to use his or her rights.  The extent of the licence’s rights is stipulated in the 
licence agreement.  The remuneration paid is usually in the form of a royalty and the 
licensor retains ownership of the copyright.  This distinguishes licensing from 
assignment, where ownership in the right actually passes to another person. 
       (Woker, 2006: 42)  
 
Therefore, owners of intellectual property have the right to know how their 
work is being distributed and used by consumers.  Most users also do not regularly 
read the fine print of the terms and conditions which accompany online media, which 
often stipulates how users are entitled to use the digital information that they 
download (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  Whilst this embodies two of the four 
cornerstones of copyright as defined by Pistorius (2006), this type of control seems to 
undermine the other two ideals of copyright, that of creating the incentive to create, 
and that which aims to advance the knowledge of culture.  With the heavy control that 
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seems to encompass copyright, it becomes difficult for future creators to adapt the 
knowledge that they see in front of them into something new, many fearing 
prosecution for copyright infringement (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). 
 
  2.3.5  The Right to Free Speech and Creativity 
 
Ultimately, knowledge grows from the ideas of others and “is always built on 
and inconceivable without the prior work of numerous people” (Martin, 1995: 11).  
The primary principle from which copyright was constructed, is the perception that 
authors should be given a limited monopoly over their work before intellectual 
property fell into the public domain (Pistorius, 2006).  This provided authors with an 
incentive to create further works, through the royalties gained during this 
monopolistic period, as well as ensure that the greater public would not be deprived of 
intellectual property over time.  However, what seems to be emerging, as the 
technologies of the globalised economy grow, is a tighter control over the 
monopolistic period, and less consideration for the cultural development of society 
(Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). 
 
There seems to be less acknowledgement that intellectual property is the result 
of an ever-growing process of learning and adapting; “we consume what we 
encounter, and it is logically untenable to assert that we are capable of distinguishing 
a particular idea-source from what lights up in our own minds” (Samuels, 2002: 358).  
Therefore, every idea that we have, has an origin within something that we have 
encountered in our own lives, and it becomes impossible to credit any idea with 
having its authentic and full origins within one’s own mind.  However, the way in 
which modern law has been structured, maintains that authors are able to create 
complete original thoughts (a concept which will be discussed further in Chapter 4), 
and so these ideas should be acknowledged by others and rewarded as such, thus 
limiting the amount of knowledge that can be manipulated and adapted to form new 
forms of intellectual property (Samuels, 2002; Martin, 1995, Merret, 2002). 
 
It would be more accurate to think of intellectual property as a constant cycle 
of learning and exchange of knowledge between different authors, rather than one 
holistically created work by one individual author (Samuels, 2002).  This would assist 
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in the expansion of culture, by permitting users to utilise various forms of intellectual 
property to create something new, and perhaps improve upon that on which it is 
based.  Robert Ostergard points out that “the right to property is granted based on 
maximising the benefits society can obtain” (1999: 156).  Therefore, if one creates a 
complete monopoly over specific works, it limits the possibility of building onto 
existing knowledge, ultimately undermining the development of global culture and 
creativity.   
 
Problematically, the rules of copyright “seem to change every few years, 
[remaining] a step behind the latest cultural or technological advances” 
(Vaidhyanathan, 2001: 3).  This has become very evident with the advent of the 
Internet and digital media products.  In terms of media production, one of the best 
ways in which the rules of copyright have been flaunted, is the practice of sampling 
(Vaidhyanathan, 2001).  This practice began in the early nineties when rap musicians 
would lift samples of other artists’ music “to weave new montages of sound” 
(Vaidhyanathan, 2001: 3), seemingly embodying the idea of utilising existing 
knowledge to adapt and build intellectual property.  However, copyright authorities 
labelled these creations as stolen ideas, from which rap artists were financially 
benefiting, eventually shutting down this practice with the help of the American 
Constitutional Court (Vaidhyanathan, 2001). 
 
This furthers the point that copyright has become more the property of 
corporations, than that of the public for which it was originally intended, because as it 
seems in the modern world “the law has lost sight of its original charge: to encourage 
creativity, science and democracy, [and instead] rewards works already created and 
limits works yet to be created” (Vaidhyanathan, 2001: 4).  However, through the 
“intertwining and redefining of media forms, in their blurring of creator, producer and 
distributor” (Atton, 2007: 65), the Web 2.0 has allowed users the opportunity to re-
introduce the art of sampling in a new way, known as digital mashing.  Whilst 
sampling of the early nineties focussed on the combination of various music samples, 
mashing is the collaboration of both visual and aural media samples, highlighting the 
vast amount of hybridisation and convergence that has become the norm through the 
varying interactive qualities offered by the Internet and online culture (Atton, 2007).  
However, the key difference between these two art forms, is that unlike samplers of 
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the early nineties, mashers do not usually look to profit from their creations; instead it 
is seen as a purely creative outlet (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006). 
 
Generally, “groups that are stigmatised or that lack power seldom have their 
viewpoints presented” (Martin, 1995: 13), but the Internet allows these groups, along 
with everyone else, the opportunity to air their specific viewpoints, and mashing 
offers an unsurpassed opportunity to air the creative ideas of the individual.  Digital 
mashing is a relatively new innovation, whereby individuals take various video and 
audio files, and combine different parts of each format to formulate a new video.  
Initially, individuals concentrated on cutting music videos together, often using the 
base line from one video, the lyrics of another, and a combination of the visuals, to 
make up their own, new style of video.  However, Internet users are no longer limiting 
themselves to creating distinct music videos, but are now also manipulating movie 
images, television programmes, and other digital images.  Research has shown that 
there are a number of reasons why users of digital media are engaging with existing 
media to create these works.  Aufderheide and Jaszi (2008) have indicated that users 
look to pay homage to various media forms, which resonate on a personal level.  As 
Coombe indicates, the experience of “social reality is a constellation of cultural 
structures that we ourselves construct and transform” (1998: 44), and as such, social 
spaces such as YouTube play a vital role in helping users create new avenues through 
which to interact with the postmodern culture.   This is further supported by the work 
Aufderheide and Jaszi (2008), who have found that many users are mashing media 
together in order to create satirical critiques of both the media itself, and various 
social issues, ranging from governmental policies to popular culture. 
 
However, this has led to an outcry from copyright authorities that Internet 
users are infringing upon copyright laws, as occurred when sampling came to the 
forefront of media production during the early nineties, but because most users are not 
looking to profit from these creations, it raises questions concerning freedom of 
speech (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  Martin describes copyright as “one technique used 
to keep information away from the public” (1995: 9), and argues that the concerted 
effort to stop users using various copyrighted works for non-profit purposes 
demonstrates that authorities are more concerned with maintaining control of 
information than protecting the interests of the authors of intellectual property 
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(Alfino, 1991; Templeton, n.d).  However, this is not without controversy.  As 
Goldsmith and Wu (2006) have quite rightly indicated, the concept of free speech is a 
wholly Western ideology, and one which does not correlate with many other cultures 
globally.  Consequently, this leads one not only to question the laws and regulations 
which govern users’ online practices, but also to question if the implementation of 
these laws is creating an imperialistic culture of Western ideals, rather than a global 
partnership of cultures.      
 



























Chapter 3 – Defining Copyright Law: 
 
 3.1  Introduction 
 
The previous chapter introduced both the history and a number of ideas 
concerning copyright within the online realm.  The purpose of this chapter is not only 
to expand on these writings, but also to create the primary legal theoretical framework 
in which to formulate the main argument for this dissertation.  The primary concepts 
of intellectual property and copyright laws have already been introduced.  This 
chapter furthers this discussion, and explains the most relevant sections of these laws 
with regards to the case studies to be used in subsequent chapters of this research.  
Contained within the first sub-section, one will be introduced to the South African 
Copyright Act and the sub-sections within this Act which focus on the laws regulating 
sound recordings, cinematography, and computer programmes.  Secondly, these will 
be juxtaposed against similar laws taken from Title 17 of the United States Code, 
highlighting the most palpable differences between the laws.  Thirdly, this section will 
conclude with a discussion of the Berne Convention, an international treaty ( which 
both South Africa and the United States have signed) citing the international policies 
on the protection of copyright abroad, as well as determining the role that the World 
Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO) plays in the implementation of these 
policies.  
 
3.2 The South African Copyright Act∗ 
 
Before one can engage in a discussion of the Copyright Act, it is first 
necessary to understand and grasp a number of definitions used within the Act, in an 
effort to relate them to the most fundamental issues of this dissertation.  The most 
important terms in regard to this research include that of the author, cinematographic 
film, a computer program, the adaptation of copy, and the infringement of copy.  Prior 
to determining if a site such as YouTube is infringing on the rights of intellectual 
authors, one first needs to verify what type of media is being broadcast and 
distributed.  Because of the digital nature of the media present within the site, it needs 
                                                 
∗ All references in this section unless otherwise indicated refer to the South African Copyright Act 98 
of 1978 – see  http://www.gpa.co.za/pdf/legislation/Copyright%20Act.pdf  
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to be investigated whether YouTube videos are classified as films or computer 
programs.  Only once this has been determined, will it be possible to discuss what 
type of infringement, if any, is taking place.   
 
In accordance with the Copyright Act of South Africa (1978), a 
cinematographic film is defined as: 
 
any fixation or storage by any means whatsoever on film or any other material of 
data, signals or a sequence of images capable, when used in conjunction with any 
other material, electronic or other device, of being seen as a moving picture and of 
reproduction, and includes the sounds embodied in a soundtrack associated with the 
film, but shall not include a computer program.  
 
This definition is clearly problematic because before one can judge if a user is 
infringing on the creative rights of filmmakers in terms of cinematography online, 
what constitutes a computer program needs to be established, considering that it is 
cited as being significantly different from a cinematographic film.  However, the 
definition of a computer program is highly ambiguous because it refers to any form of 
online activity as a: 
 
“set of instructions fixed or stored in any manner and which, when used directly or 
indirectly in a computer, directs its operation to bring about a result.” 
 
Therefore, within the interactive Web 2.0 of the current online realm, every 
action taken by a user which results in an output of some type could be seen as a 
computer program, resulting in a distinctive blur between that which is an actual 
intellectual work and that which is a due process of interaction.  Consequently, this 
dissertation will need to take this into consideration and examine each example as a 
specific individual case, rather than to group all YouTube creations as the same.   
 
More problems arise if one considers that when examining film in the context 
of copyright, the author is seen as “the person by whom the arrangements for the 
making of the film were made”, thus generally seen as the producer or production 
house.  However, in the context of any material that is made through computer 
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generation, the authorship is awarded to “the person by whom the arrangements 
necessary for the creation were undertaken”.  While these definitions seem to be 
similar in terms of rewarding those who implemented the organisation of the work, 
digital design is unique because it usually only involves one individual in the 
production process with very little cost, unlike the hundreds contracted to work on a 
film.  Problematically, once a film enters the digital realm to be manipulated by a 
user, it seems to become a grey area of authorship which makes it difficult to 
conclude where authorship rests.   
 
However, whilst there are these discrepancies within these South African legal 
terms as to whom a work should be accredited with regard to digital works, the 
definition of infringement is far more comprehensible.  As stipulated by the South 
African Copyright Act, an infringement of copyright occurs in both cinematography 
and computer programmes when a copy is made of either, without express prior 
consent from the author.  And whilst digital mashing does not attempt to copy the 
work of another author explicitly, it does “borrow” significant portions to create 
something new.  Importantly, this leads one to consider various general exceptions 
made within South African copyright law with regard to the reproduction of works.  
The Act states that reproductions are permitted, in terms of South African law, so long 
as the reproduction is not in direct conflict with “a normal exploitation of the work 
and is not unreasonably prejudicial to the legitimate interests of the owner of the 
copyright”; therefore, if one chooses to utilise the work of another, it cannot be in 
direct competition or take away any of the benefits that such a work could create for 
the original author. 
 
It is not only the manipulation and copying of work that can be seen as 
infringing on intellectual property rights.  Technically, a work which uses the 
creations of another artist has to be seen in a public forum before one can propose 
copyright theft.  In accordance with South African law and with regard to digital 
mashing, one can only be held accountable for their actions if that creation is 
broadcast publicly.  With regard to the issues discussed within this dissertation, this 
too becomes problematic.  This arises due to the confusion between publication of 
film in terms of broadcast, and the transmission of information through a diffusion 
service.  A diffusion service is understood as “a telecommunication service of 
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transmissions consisting of sounds, images, signs or signals, which takes place over 
wires or other paths provided by material substance and intended for reception by 
specific members of the public”, whereas a broadcast is “a telecommunication service 
of transmissions consisting of sounds, images, signs or signals which – (a) takes place 
by means of electromagnetic waves of frequencies of lower than 3 000 GHz 
transmitted in space without an artificial conductor; and (b) is intended for reception 
by the public or sections of the public, and includes the emitting of programme-
carrying signals to a satellite”.  Overall, publication and broadcast do not include 
transmission through a diffusion service; subsequently one could argue that digital 
mashers are not infringing on copyright within South Africa because they are not 
publishing or re-publishing the works of other artists, only transmitting information.   
 
With regard to this dissertation, it is also important to acknowledge copyright 
protection in terms of moral rights, which guards an author’s work from being 
distorted, mutilated, or modified in any way which could damage their dignity or 
reputation.  This clause ensures that the intellectual works of authors does not lose 
respectability, which could result in a loss of revenue.  This is the main concern as 
termed by the Copyright Act of South Africa, as the primary reasoning for protecting 
one’s intellectual property.  In terms of Section 27, which outlines all penalties and 
proceedings dealing with copyright infringement, it is the extent to which an author 
loses out financially, that determines the extent of infringement; therefore, South 
African law is primarily concerned with protecting the economic welfare of authors. 
  
3.3 Copyright Law of the United States – Title 17 of the US Code∗ 
 
Whilst the definitions regarding computer programs and film are relatively 
similar to that of the South African Copyright Act, one of the most notable differences 
between the United States and South Africa is that the United States considers the 
collection and assembling of pre-existing intellectual property into a cohesive whole 
as an original work of authorship, a clause which South African law ignores.  This 
section of law acknowledges that in certain instances, authors will use and build on 
the works of others to compile variants of intellectual property, ultimately creating 
                                                 
∗ All references in this section unless otherwise indicated refer to Circular 92 – Copyright Law of the 
United States Title 17 of the US Code – see http://www.copyright.gov/title17/circ92.pdf  
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what can be deemed an original work in itself.  In addition to the idea of compilations, 
Title 17 also serves to protect derivative works, which are deemed to be artistic 
creations “based upon one or more pre-existing works […] in which a work may be 
recast, transformed or adapted.”  Yet, as these definitions stand, compilations and 
derivative works do not “extend to any part of the work in which such material has 
been used unlawfully”; therefore, before artists can change or manipulate older 
creations to create their own formulations and adaptations, they are required, as per 
any other use of copyrighted material, to gain permission from the original author or 
they lose the right to protection over their newer formulation of creativity.   
 
Apart from this aspect, American law, unlike South African law which 
distinguishes the difference between publication and transmission, regards any display 
or performance of work as a form of publication.  It does not separate the ways in 
which a work is communicated, and the publication of an artistic creation is conveyed 
“by means of any device or process” to the public, regardless of the medium.  
Therefore, those users bound by American law cannot manipulate or build on older 
intellectual works and display them publicly within a forum such as YouTube, without 
gaining express prior consent from the original author, in fear of infringing upon 
copyright laws.    
 
However, one of the most important exception clauses, which falls under 
American copyright law, states that any modification to a work of visual art is 
permitted if that newer modification is seen as being part of the “inherent nature of 
the materials”.  One could therefore argue that within the Web 2.0, interactivity and 
continual user adaptations of online material forms part of the inherent nature of 
online user behaviour, and so the manipulation of visual art online is the most natural 
way in which to expand and grow user creativity.  Yet a problem arises if one 
considers that not all material found online was initially formulated within the online 
realm, but rather within the scopes of cinematography and sound recordings. 
 
While each of these clauses are very important in determining if one is 
infringing on copyright law, one of the most important dilemmas that arises within 
Title 17 regarding the protection of copyright, is the description of what constitutes a 
criminal copyright offence.  Problematically, the law stipulates that one can only be 
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found guilty of criminal infringement if either one of two criteria is filled.  Firstly, a 
person can be held liable for criminal prosecution if the purpose of their act was to 
gain “commercial advantage or private financial gain”, or secondly, if the 
reproduction or distribution of material has amounted to the equivalent of one 
thousand dollars or more in retail loss within a 180 day time period.  Under this 
section, it becomes clear that the protection of copyright hinges primarily on the 
economic control of production, because if neither of these criteria are met, the only 
viable action courts can take is to impose an injunction, preventing further distribution 
or publication of this material.  Therefore, unless one financially benefits, or prevents 
the original author from making a profit, there is very little incentive to ward off 
copyright infringement in terms of American copyright law.  
 
Apart from the minor penalty of an injunction against further reproduction and 
distribution, American law is not very restrictive in terms of imposing this injunction.  
According to Section 502 (b) of Title 17, any injunction served by an American court 
can only be enforced within the borders of the United States.  Therefore, users can 
only be found in contempt of the court’s ruling if they ignore the injunction against 
them whilst in the United States, and consequently it does not prevent them from 
distributing and reproducing content elsewhere in the world.  It is this issue which has 
led many countries worldwide to sign international copyright and intellectual property 
agreements and treaties, in an effort to combat this type of activity. 
 
 3.4 The Role of International Policy in Copyright Law  
 
As has been discussed in Chapter 2, copyright law is difficult to protect on an 
international scale due to its territorial nature.  Possibly one of the biggest dilemmas 
facing copyright in terms of the Internet, is that as a network connected to many other 
networks, it is never “terminated by frontiers” (van Dijk, 2006: 128), consequently 
leaving the jurisdiction for the prosecution of offenders indeterminate.  As already 
stipulated, the laws of most countries are often only concerned with infringement that 
occurs within their borders, and subsequently both the United States and South 
African Copyright Acts are very restrictive in terms of punishing copyright infringers 
on a global scale.  Apart from this, current laws have often had difficulty grasping the 
notion that online behaviour is often a mixture of both the public and the private, 
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resulting in “solutions that not only control but also help online actions to move in the 
[wrong] direction” (van Dijk, 2006: 127).   These dilemmas have resulted in both 
countries signing various international treaties, which aim to develop international 
policy, rather than creating new laws which become outdated abruptly and constantly.  
One of the most important treaties that the United States and South Africa have signed 
is the Berne Convention, and both countries have in recent times also become 
members of the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO). 
 
The Berne Convention is considered to be the most important international 
treaty with regard to copyright protection.  It considers those countries which have 
agreed to sign the Convention, as members of a Union to protect the rights of authors 
to their artistic and literary works (Berne Convention, 1979), and as such, agree to 
adhere to the policies stipulated in a unified manner.  In so doing, those within the 
Union agree that foreign authors are granted the same protection as national authors, 
and are given a minimum copyright term of the author’s life plus fifty years 
thereafter.  However, in relation to cinematographic works, “countries of the Union 
may provide that the term of protection shall expire fifty years after the work has been 
made available to the public with the consent of the author, or, failing such an event 
within fifty years from the making of such a work, fifty years after the making” 
(Berne Convention, 1971).  This agreement also ensures that authors have the scope 
to protect their moral rights, even if they have transferred their economic rights.  This 
ensures that an author is able “to object to any distortion, mutilation or other 
modification of, or other derogatory action in relation to, the said work, which would 
be prejudicial to his honor or reputation” (Berne Convention, 1971).  Furthermore, 
copyright comes into effect automatically once the requirements, as stipulated in the 
Convention, are met: hence “no formal procedures are required for registration” 
(D’Amato & Long, 1996).  This often problematises the protection of film because 
there is “no obligation on a copyright owner to register the copyright” (Ibid).  This 
makes it far more difficult to litigate against infringers because without registration, it 
becomes far more difficult to establish and claim authorship over a production. 
 
The way in which this agreement is utilised, is monitored and administered by 
the World Intellectual Property Organisation (WIPO).  WIPO, as an agency of the 
United Nations (UN), acts to promote the protection of intellectual property globally, 
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and is devoted to developing cooperation between developed and developing nations 
(WIPO, 2008).  WIPO is responsible for the administration of various treaties and 
agreements, all of which fall into three varying categories: treaties that establish 
international protection, those that facilitate international protection, and those which 
establish classification systems for intellectual property and the procedures which aim 
to improve said systems.  Under each of these sections fall hundreds of various 
treaties, which aim to improve intellectual property policy and law, but require 
continual international interpretation and negotiation to ensure that they uphold the 
basic premise of WIPO: to ensure that the knowledge economies of the 21st century 
shall be driven responsibly by intellectual property to benefit the welfare of humanity 
(WIPO, 2002).  
 
The preamble of the WIPO agreement stipulates that the main ideals of the 
organisation aims “to contribute to better understanding and cooperation among states 
from their mutual benefit on the basis of respect for their sovereignty and equality; 
[aiming] to encourage creative activity, to promote the protection of intellectual 
property; [and aiming] to modernize and render more efficient the administration of 
the Unions established in the fields of the protection of industrial property and the 
protection of literary and artistic works, while fully respecting the independence of 
each of the Unions” (WIPO, 1967).  However, as with any international agreement, 
that which is agreed upon has to be interpreted within the basic laws of a specific 
nation state.  Subsequently, the member states of WIPO have to recognise and respect 
those decisions in which nation states do not adhere to the policies stipulated within 
the Berne Convention.  Often this results from a conflict of interests between 
international policy and national law.   
 
As van Dijk points out, “international regulation usually stops at general 
declarations and basic principles agreed upon by international institutions.  No matter 
how important these declarations and principles are as an impetus to international 
legislation, they do not themselves have any real practical meaning” (2006: 128-129).  
Problematically, every country has built their laws upon varying “philosophical 
foundations” (D’Amato & Long, 1996) themselves based on the role played by a 
“nation’s culture and history [regarding] the protection of expression, ideas and 
invention” (Ibid).  However, the territorial variability that this implies, proves why 
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there is such an imperative need for countries to adopt international legislation as a 
practical solution to the borderless realm of the Internet.  Ultimately, a “separate 
jurisdiction is no longer adequate for integrated networks” (van Dijk, 2006: 129) like 
the Internet, because one cannot justify the viewpoint that one nation state’s ideas of 
intellectual property and copyright are of more value than those of any other.  Whilst 
there is a need for territorial laws with which to govern the offline world, the online 
poses new and unique problems in the formulation of governance.  Therefore, 
member states of an organisation such as WIPO, need to acknowledge that in a 
continually growing virtual global environment like the Internet, territorial laws have 
become somewhat obsolete.   
 
The policies formulated under the Union of WIPO should accordingly carry 
more weight with regard to international protection and negotiation of intellectual 
property and copyright enforcement.  Importantly, these treaties, and the WIPO 
agreement itself, should not attempt to instil the values of individual nation states, like 
that of individual laws, but rather aim to discuss and negotiate the varying ideologies 
and beliefs, with regard to copyright protection, of all the member nations.  Whilst 
one cannot assume that there will be absolute agreement between member nations, the 
negotiation of these ideals will highlight the areas in which stricter policies should be 
implemented, and at times, where the protection of copyright can be relaxed to 
promote in the development of knowledge within developing nations.  The only way 
in which this can be achieved is through negotiation and consultation between the 
various cultures, needs, and histories of individual nations with regard to knowledge 
dissemination.  Importantly, a distinction needs to be made between claiming 
copyright control as a development tool, on the one hand, and as a reward for artistic 
creativity on the other.  This distinction, moreover, can only be made once one has 
addressed the philosophical and ethical aspects of the control and implementation of 
copyright and the conceptualisation of intellectual property.     
    
 
 








This chapter acts as the most pivotal philosophical and ethical theoretical 
component from which to trace conclusions for this dissertation.  Drawing on the 
works of a number of theorists, this chapter aims initially to discuss the viability of 
claiming originality when looking to protect intellectual works via copyright.  It 
explores the concept that all knowledge is built upon previous findings and works of 
older authors and creative artists, thus questioning the ethical and moral issues 
associated with limiting the availability of knowledge by means of monopolising 
creative exploits.  Secondly, this chapter will discuss how monopolisation is of greater 
benefit for those looking for institutional control over creative works, rather than 
guaranteeing financial rewards for artists and protecting the individual creative mind. 
 
This chapter will consequently explore the concept that copyright, as an ideal 
of Westernised thinking, is a way of ensuring the political and economic control of 
developed countries over developing nations.  Furthermore, this chapter will explore 
how current Internet technology is beginning to challenge this control, and 
subsequently why institutions are fervently trying to undermine the basic premise of 
an interactive Web: freely and openly to exchange knowledge online.  However, one 
cannot dismiss the notion that individual creativity should be rewarded in some way, 
thus this chapter explores varying types of intellectual property and their uses within 
global society, in an effort to distinguish between that which is needed to ensure 
development, and that which is wanted for entertainment. 
 
Finally, this chapter concludes by looking at YouTube itself, and the rules and 
regulations which supposedly govern the behaviour of users.  By establishing these 
norms, along with the ideas surrounding intellectual property and copyright proposed 
by the previous sub-sections, one should then be able to draw conclusions from the 
case studies, to be used later on, as to whether or not there is still a place for copyright 
within the online realm, or if sites such as YouTube are creating cultures of collective 
creativity and sharing with no need for the binding constraints of copyright protection. 
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 4.2 Originality: Fact or Fiction? 
 
All mankind is of one author, and is one volume, when one man dies, one chapter is not torn out of the 
book, but translated into a better language; and every chapter must be so translated  
         - John Donne 
 
The Internet has evolved into the biggest social network ever known, and in so 
doing has created a home for the quick and effective exchange of knowledge.  The 
way in which users utilise the Internet is continually changing, growing from basic 
written interaction of e-mails, to live video streaming and many other varieties of 
interactivity, aiding in communication.  However, it is the underlying technology of 
the Internet which makes copyright holders resent the innovations of a networked 
world.  As technology in the online realm becomes more and more interactive, so it 
increases the temptation and ease with which users are able to manipulate digital 
material (Akester, 2004).  Therefore, copyright holders invest a great deal of time and 
money to ensure that their works are not used in any way that could deprive them of 
their right to protection. 
 
However, the problem with this way of thinking is that if one investigates the 
principles behind copyright, one discovers that it “is a ‘right’ in no absolute sense; it 
is a government-granted monopoly on the use of creative results” (Lethem, 2007).  
Much emphasis in protecting intellectual property stems from the belief that copyright 
gives artists the freedom to develop wholly original thought.  If one is rewarded for 
intellectual property, it then stands to reason that an artist will feel the security to 
develop further new and innovative ideas.  Paul Saint-Amour highlights that 
originality is the pillar of intellectual property law, but that it in no way aims to 
protect the “ideas, procedures, processes, systems, methods of operation, concepts, 
principles, facts, discoveries, or pre-existent expression incorporated into the work” 
(2003: 2).  Problematically, however, it is difficult to justify the notion of complete 
original thought, because ultimately, not only are all creative ideas inspired or 
influenced by those which preceded it, but knowledge is fragmentary, reduced to 
varying pieces of a much bigger puzzle, subsequently diluting the original work into a 
pool of collaboration (Capurro, 2000).  This especially seems to be evident within the 
media landscape of the postmodern era, in which many genres and media styles have 
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emerged from what has been termed the MTV aesthetic, “characterized by the 
hallmarks of hybridity, multiplicity and fragmentation” (Bolter, 2006: 109). 
 
Lisa Samuels indicates that “intellectual property is transhistorical” (2002: 
358), building on the ideas and knowledge from the past.  The human mind is 
continually adapting and assimilating that which it encounters, consequently creating 
a memory bank of intellectual property.  These memories become so well embedded 
within the human psyche that often we are unaware from where creative inspiration 
derives.  This type of memory has been termed crypomnesia, which acknowledges the 
presence of a hidden, and unacknowledged memory; a collection of thoughts which is 
intrinsically part of any creative process (Lethem, 2007).  If one considers the history 
of literature, it is somewhat impossible to consider that an author has never engaged 
with any other form of writing, and yet most authors would consider their creation as 
a wholly original piece of work.  However, “all ideas are secondhand, consciously and 
unconsciously drawn from a million outside sources […] there is not a rag of 
originality about them anywhere except the little discolouration they get from [an 
author’s] mental and moral caliber” (Lethem, 2007), and even that, according to 
Jonathan Lethem (2007), is a remnant of outside influence.    
 
He also proposes that intellectual property is like language, and as such, 
should be considered as a vast commons, “altered by every contributor, [and] 
expanded by even the most passive user” (2007).  Overall, the way in which a piece of 
work is interpreted is determined by each individual.  Every person has a unique 
perspective on the meanings found within a creative work, and subsequently will 
build upon that idea in conjunction with that which is already embedded in their 
memory, because one’s understanding and interpretation of knowledge depends in 
part on the individual’s own prejudices and “on the knower’s frame of reference” 
(Capurro, 2000: 79). Therefore, one can note that the expansion of knowledge occurs 
through an author’s expression of that which they have encountered, and 
subconsciously incorporated into their thought patterns.  Whilst the outcome of an 
author’s creative process may be a new piece of knowledge, it cannot be deemed as a 
fully original piece of work because one cannot justify the belief that creative thought 
is “conjured out of thin air, [or are] fruits of individual imaginations” (Hafstein, 2004: 
308), but rather a reflection of that which preceded it.  Just as the moon glorifies the 
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night sky, it only does so through the reflection of something far greater than itself; “a 
human being is not an isolated inquirer trying to reach others or the outside world 
from his or her encapsulated mind/brain, but is already sharing the world with others” 
(Capurro, 2000: 80). 
  
Traditionally, knowledge has been understood as the “result of creation and 
innovation by a collective originator: the community” (Hafstein, 2004: 300).  It has 
only been through the rise of industrialisation that intellectual property and 
knowledge have become overt commodifications of the individual.   In order to 
investigate the history of knowledge formation, one only needs to look at the 
abundance of indigenous knowledge developed within global oral cultures.  
Subsequently, one would discover that not only is it derived from “communal effort” 
(Oguamanam, 2004: 142), but that it has developed “in an incremental fashion” (Ibid: 
143) from a history which is immemorial.  It is precisely through this reasoning that 
Oguamanam is able to argue that knowledge is continually growing within “the public 
domain as [a] common heritage of mankind and ought to be freely available to all 
people” (2004: 143).  Yet, this common heritage has become a site of contentious 
debate as authors and Western powers claim it as their own, aiming to reward the 
individual rather than the culture from which it was established.  If one was to 
investigate the works of Oscar Wilde, it would become apparent that much of what he 
profited from was not original thought, but instead the transcription of traditional Irish 
folklore into printed copy (Saint-Amour, 2003).  His example led to many more 
authors pilfering traditional works which Wilde himself never published, but had 
recited orally to others, thus assisting in the creation of “a community of plagarists” 
(Saint-Amour, 2003: 96).  Wilde’s open discussion of literary ideas and expressions 
united writers in what could be termed, under modern copyright law, as a culture of 
theft, but in reality, he had given authors an opportunity to relay and communicate 
ideas which otherwise may have disappeared from modern life.  This way of thinking 
is something that should be considered further within today’s society of copyright 
enforcement, especially when considering one of the most contentious areas of 
copyright law, that of musical creation.   
 
Whilst exploring the history of music, one would discover that “[b]lues and 
jazz musicians have long been enabled by a kind of ‘open-source’ culture, in which 
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pre-existing melodic fragments and larger musical frameworks are freely reworked” 
(Lethem, 2007).  They themselves have acknowledged that “creativity is a social 
process” (Hafstein, 2004: 307) and that music can only grow through the adaptation 
and absorption of communal development; consequently strengthening the “idea-
expression dichotomy” (Vaidhyathan, 2001: 15).  Muddy Waters, described as one of 
the greatest blues artists of all time, has acknowledged that his own creations were 
influenced and built from old slave songs, as well as other blues musicians of the time 
(Vaidhyathan, 2001).  Without frameworks to work from, and to incorporate into his 
own work, he would never have been able to create any of the music for which he is 
most famous.  Some of his work was adapted by Elvis Presley to formulate the 
revolutionary and ‘original’ sounds of modern day rock ‘n roll (Wall, 2004).  
Ironically, it is the music of Elvis Presley that has become world-renowned by 
Western standards, deeming that his work is of more worth than that which preceded 
it, consequently deserving more stringent control in terms of its use and distribution. 
 
It could be argued that the work of Presley does not infringe, or even detract 
from the older works it has derived from, based on the doctrine of fair use.  It could be 
argued that this type of appropriation is transformative in nature, subsequently 
nullifying accusations of copyright theft.  By transforming those works which have 
inspired or assisted in the creation of Presley’s works, many would argue in favour of 
a Lockean theory, which states that one should be rewarded creative rights, if they 
have added value to a work through individual labour (Tushnet, 2007).  While this 
reasoning could be used to protect the credibility of an artist such as Presley, the law 
itself implies that it is the innovation of originality that is of the most value, ultimately 
proving through this example that intellectual property rights are no more than 
“capitalist creations, designed to serve the market economy and advance commercial 
interests” (Oguamanam, 2004: 145), rather than a reward for innovation.  It becomes 
difficult to argue against the fact that the work of Presley is so ardently protected 
because of how successful an artist he was.  Had he not become one of the most 
iconic figures of commodified music history, it is most likely that his work would 
have faded into the recesses of hidden memory.  Yet some of his work, as previously 
mentioned, was crafted by Muddy Waters, who in turn took parts of other musical 
works to create pieces – pieces which have been sidelined by the ideals of Western 
copyright law to further the monopoly of record labels over the music industry, 
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ultimately proving that “Western intellectual property rights [are] essentially the 
practice of theft” (Oguamanam, 2004: 147). 
 
This point is further emphasised if one considers that when up-and-coming rap 
artists, in the early nineties, lifted “samples of other people’s music to weave new 
montages of sound” (Vaidhyathan, 2001: 15) they were often met with contempt, and 
accusations of compromising copyright law.  This was due to the fact that very few 
rap artists would pay or credit those from whom they copied.  Yet, this type of activity 
was ultimately the foundation for the success of Elvis Presley and many other so-
called pioneers of the rock ‘n roll culture in the 1950’s – the only difference being that 
the work of Presley and the like, were derived from the cultural collaboration of slave 
ancestry, and not the conglomerates of the recording industry, as with modern rap 
montages.  However, as Jonathan Lethem indicates, “appropriation, mimicry, 
quotation, allusion, and sublimated collaboration consist of a kind of sine qua non of 
the creative act, cutting across all forms and genres in the realm of cultural 
production” (2007). 
 
Some may argue however, that it was legitimate for Presley to borrow the 
aspects of music that he did because it was derived from that which was in the public 
domain, just as many borrow aspects from famous literature whose copyrights have 
expired and fallen into the public domain.  Based on this argument, it is reasonable to 
propose that the work of Presley and the like too should fall into the public domain to 
be used freely and openly by today’s new creative artists, and not monopolised by 
corporate powers.  This therefore leads one to question if the ethics behind copyright 
law actually aim to benefit individual artists, or if it is instead a hegemonic 
manipulation of the human conscious by a powerful elite, in an effort to control 
culture. 
 
 4.3  Copyright: Corporate Control or Individual Growth? 
 
One of the primary pillar stones of copyright, as already mentioned in 
previous chapters, aims to allow authors a monopoly over their work in order to create 
an incentive for further creation.  However, in order to guarantee that this monopoly 
does not limit the advancement of public knowledge, it is supposedly only granted for 
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a limited period of time.  This ideally aims to reward creative practice without 
“overtaxing the collective” (Saint-Amour, 2003: 4), but problematically, in the 
modern era, this balance seems to be tilting toward undermining the collective in 
favour of the individual; and even then, one begins to question if it is really the 
individual who is being protected, or instead, the corporations of the global economy.  
 
As stated by the Copyright Acts of both South Africa and the United States, as 
well as according to the Berne Convention, copyright should be held for fifty years 
after the death of the author before entering the public domain.  However, in 1998, the 
United States introduced the Sonny Bono Copyright Extension Act, which allowed 
authors a further twenty years of protection after their death (Saint-Amour, 2003; 
Woker, 2006).  This Act has coined the phrase “copyright creep”, implying that 
copyright is slowly becoming a permanent fixture within artistic creations, rather than 
one of limited time.  Conveniently, the Extension Act coincided with the expiration of 
Disney’s copyright over Mickey Mouse, subsequently giving Disney another twenty 
years of control over their most famous cartoon (Saint-Amour, 2003).  One cannot 
deny the example of “relentless corporate domination” (Wirtén, 2004: 100) that this 
renewal has allowed within the global knowledge economy.  Ultimately, Disney is not 
wary of losing financial gain from the likes of Mickey Mouse falling into the public 
domain, but realistically, it is the fear of losing outright control of the cartoon image 
that they are attempting to curb.  If Disney allowed the likes of Mickey Mouse to fall 
into the public domain, it is unlikely that they would see a massive decrease in their 
financial standings if one considers the abundance of media that they currently own 
and create; however, it would give their competitors the opportunity to utilise the 
character and create direct competition for the Disney corporation.  Thus the 
introduction of the Extension Act has emphasised the monopolistic tendencies of 
Western capitalism which aims to curb open competition.   
 
One may dismiss this as an entirely American issue, but, since corporations 
realised the potential of the Internet in the early nineties, American policy makers 
have continuously attempted to convince the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) signatories (unsuccessfully so far) to adopt policies which would hand over 
greater control to corporations with regard to copyright (Litman, 2001).  Apart from 
this, one of the most telling issues facing ethics in regard to copyright, is that the 
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majority of lobbyists and senior staff with whom Congress have worked to draw up 
revisions to copyright laws, are directly related to and working with the music, 
publishing, film and computer industries (Ibid).  The current copyright bills were only 
drawn up and submitted “after private stakeholders agreed with one another on their 
substantive provisions” (Litman, 2001: 71), ultimately indicating that it is the private 
interests of corporations, and not that of the individual artist, which current copyright 
law has been designed to protect.  As Mark Poster (2008) has described, if the ideals 
of the nation-state prevail, American forms of copyright will dominate global 
institutions, and culture will become an ever-increasing commodified item.  One can 
therefore conclude that copyright has evolved from its initial principles, to a new line 
of thinking, focussing more on controlling the consumption of creative works, rather 
than fostering an environment of incentive to produce (Litman, 2001; Templeton, 
n.d).   
 
Vaidhyathan (2001) has outlined that the change in the interpretation of law 
has created an environment in which that which has already been created is rewarded, 
consequently limiting that which is still to be discovered and crafted.  As corporations 
build greater barriers in terms of copyright protection, the result becomes alarmingly 
negative for public good.  The shift in copyright protection that has emerged during 
the twentieth century has guaranteed that it is about protecting the “rights of the 
publisher first, authors second, and the public a distant third” (Vaidhyathan, 2001: 
11), a contradiction which should not be ignored, if one considers that intellectual 
property protection was initially introduced during the 19th century, as a way in which 
authors were able to gain some form of autonomy from both patronage and publishers 
(Wirtén, 2004).  Therefore, copyright protection is not enforced to protect authors, 
and create incentives for them to produce, but instead it has become “an incentive to 
bribe publishers to invest in finding authors” (Litman, 2001: 104).  Only once a 
publisher has elected to invest in an author, does it become possible for authors to be 
financially rewarded for their work, and even then, they are not rewarded full 
financial gains; only a small portion of the profits are filtered down to them, whilst 
publishing corporations see both the greatest gains, as well as the right to control all 
distribution and reproductions. 
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Apart from this, when the US Constitution was drafted, James Madison was 
adamant that copyright should only be protected as an instrument for progress and 
learning, to promote an informed citizenry (Vaidhyanathan, 2001).  But what one can 
note, is that copyright has shifted away from promoting the development of 
knowledge, to a closed law, protecting those in control of global knowledge.  A 
country like South Africa, which is plagued by the inequalities created during its 
turbulent history, should aim to fervently develop public knowledge in order to create 
an informed society; however, the reproduction of knowledge still aims to protect the 
informed far more than promoting its free exchange among its citizens.  One such 
example are the complex structures surrounding the expropriation of intellectual 
capital and the political economy of academic publishing.     
 
Helge Rønning indicates that “information needs to circulate easily in a liberal 
democratic polity in order to facilitate innovation” (2006: 25).  And yet, what one 
notices whilst attempting to gain access to true developmental knowledge, based on 
research aimed to further the ideas of society, is a wall of capitalism, forcing one to 
pay exorbitant fees.  Academic research is strictly controlled by publishers, thus only 
allowing the financially elite access to information.  As Christopher Merrett (2006) 
points out, publishers worldwide look to make huge financial gains from research 
which is administered by institutions of higher learning.  Many academics are forced 
to accept a once-off fee for their works, whilst simultaneously forfeiting their 
individual copyrights to journal publishers, in order to further their careers.  Journal 
publishers then sell back these works to tertiary institutions at highly inflated prices, 
arguing that doing so assists in ensuring a high quality of peer-reviewed research 
(Merrett, 2006).  This practice has led to extensive problems for poorer developing 
nations, because they are generally unable to afford the subscription fees for many of 
these academic works. 
 
One could therefore argue that this aims only to fulfil the premise that 
“property rights have always worked in favour of the colonizer” (Wirtén, 2004: 101).  
By limiting the access that developing nations can gain over intellectual property, the 
West ensures their economic grip on world markets, because the power of the West 
will only come to an end once developing nations are able to compete with the 
knowledge development of Western forces.  Many believed that with the advent of the 
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Internet and communicative technologies this power would begin to shift, giving 
developing nations the opportunity to gain free access to important knowledge which 
could aid in their development.  However, developing countries now seem to be at an 
even greater disadvantage, due firstly to limited Internet connectivity, and secondly to 
the move by publishers only to offer many of their journals in a subscription-based 
online format (Pistorius, 2006), ultimately limiting access to physical works, as well 
as creating a temporal limit on the availability of works, before requiring one to renew 
their subscription of a work that has already been paid for.  
 
Global organisations have however recognised this problem, and so have 
proposed a number of ways in which to solve this dilemma.  Organisations such as 
WIPO and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), have acknowledged that developing 
countries need to be given special concessions in terms of intellectual property laws, 
because they often require specific knowledge in order to develop their education and 
skills-based systems.  It is of the utmost importance that they are able to publish and 
re-work intellectual property in a way to help bridge the knowledge divide between 
themselves and the developed world.  As indicated by Cornish, concessions were 
“moulded into a Protocol to the Berne Convention at the Stockholm Revision in 
1976” (1989: 252), which gave developing nations the right to decrease the terms of 
copyright in order to “authorise translation into their national languages; to authorise 
publishing for educational and cultural purposes and to exclude from the scope of 
infringement reproduction for teaching, study or research; and to limit the scope of the 
right to broadcast” (Ibid).  However, as discussed, few developing countries are able 
to afford the high price involved in gaining legitimate reproduction rights of 
copyrighted works and most developed nations are pushing for concessions to be 
removed from developing nations.  
 
One cannot dismiss the fact that intellectual property laws are of some value to 
authors; however, to limit the exportation of necessary information to developing 
nations could be viewed as a violation of basic human rights.  As Ostergard explains, 
“if certain individuals have exclusive control over established technologies, other 
individuals may be deprived of basic products that could contribute to their 
betterment” (1999: 158).  By limiting the amount of information that a country can 
use to assist in the betterment of society, overall disadvantaging the well-being of 
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citizenry in order to maintain profit, violates all ideals of human rights which states 
that every person be given: 
 
a standard of living adequate for the health and well-being of himself and of his 
family, including food, clothing, housing and medical care and necessary social 
services. 
                       (Universal Declaration of Human Rights, Article 25)  
 
As a result, information is needed in order to procure these types of 
conditions, and should be exchanged and built upon consistently by both developed 
and developing nations.  Yet as already mentioned, resources of developing nations 
are often limited, consequently hindering efforts “to aid those in need of product 
access” (Ostergard, 1999: 162), subsequently placing responsibility on developed 
countries to advocate the growth of knowledge.  By limiting the amount of knowledge 
that is shared with developing nations, developed countries create even greater 
dilemmas for global markets, because as under-developed countries seek constant 
foreign assistance and investment to sustain their economies, they, in turn, in fact 
weaken Western economies.    
 
Ironically, those nations which are the strongest supporters of intellectual 
property protection – including the United States – were themselves initially reliant on 
the adoption of many “foreign inventions, creations, and ideas” (Ostergard, 1999: 
177) during their developmental stages – ideas which they were able to adapt to 
promote “their continued growth and development” (Ibid).  This again emphasises the 
point that developed countries are overzealous in terms of intellectual property 
protection in an attempt to maximise their own market potential within the ever-
expanding competition of the globalised economy.  But this type of thinking is rather 
short-sighted if one considers that it is the global economy that these nations wish to 
engage in.  After all, if “developed countries delay the creation of markets that could 
support entry of technologically advanced [intellectual property, they would cut] short 
the potential profits that could be obtained if the developing countries could sustain 
themselves” (Ostergard, 1999:177); hence they should be looking to promote 
development as much as possible in order to guarantee their own market potential for 
the future.  If developed nations were concerned with long-term economic benefits 
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they should look to increase their market base for the future.  Isolating and 
disadvantaging the entry of these countries into the global intellectual market, further 
cements Western ideology as the dominant culture, thus undermining any other 
cultural viewpoint, and inevitably destabilizes any prospect of a true global economy.  
 
It is understandable that developed nations would be reluctant to give up their 
dominance within the global knowledge economy.  However, as Ostergard (1999) 
proposes, global entities need to acknowledge that varying forms of intellectual 
property need to be utilised and protected in varying ways.  The problem with 
fervently protecting all forms of intellectual property is the reality that not all 
intellectual property constitutes the same value in the progression of developmental 
structures.  For example, it can be argued that academic writing advocating the 
advancement of democratic structures, are of far more importance in terms of 
development than the latest Hollywood blockbuster; subsequently, this means that 
definite lines need to be drawn up by international organisations in order to determine 
the difference between intellectual property which is needed for advancement, and 
that which is wanted for personal enjoyment.  However, this line is not clear-cut, as 
many individuals see the Internet as providing a platform to exploit and manipulate 
entertainment media into their own unique artistic creations, especially when one 
begins to analyse a site such as YouTube.   
 
As already mentioned, knowledge development is highly dependent on that 
which came before it.  Not only do we witness the unique transformations of older 
creative forms, but it has also been acknowledged that artistic inspiration can be 
derived from many different avenues.  Therefore, it becomes far more problematic to 
determine, in terms of entertainment copyright, what should be protected to reward 
the investment of publishers, and that which allows new artists the opportunity to 
create from entertainment media.  Overall the “hyperstrict measures to restrict use of 
copyrighted materials [could] squelch an emerging phenomenon that is full of 






4.4  YouTube: Communication Network or Pirate Ship? 
 
YouTube has exploded into the largest online video sharing site, whereby users 
are able to upload and share personal video creations with other online consumers.  
Whilst some use the site to upload clips of personal home movies, news events, and 
mainstream media, many users post creative interpretations of other media formats.  
Many have claimed that these types of sites promote piracy and copyright 
infringement, whilst its advocators believe that it promotes user creativity, and assists 
in elevating the knowledge economy (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2008).  However, whilst 
this dissertation is still in the process of determining the outcome to this argument, 
one has to acknowledge that which ever way one turns, sites such as this have assisted 
in evolving fan consumerism into a fandom of production.  The creators of YouTube 
itself are very aware of the dangers that a site such as theirs poses to the legal battle 
surrounding copyright.  However, as with copyright law itself, the regulations which 
govern the site are convoluted, contradictory, and open to individual interpretation. 
 
As with most online service providers, YouTube renounces any responsibility 
for the content which their users upload, stating that it is entirely up to the individual 
user to gain permission and licenses for any material that may require such.  This in 
itself is not a difficult rule to follow, and as such YouTube could quite easily censor 
those who do not abide by this regulation.  However, problems arise when one further 
investigates the requirements laid out by the site regarding user submissions.  Once a 
user posts any form of content, they “grant YouTube a worldwide, non-exclusive, 
royalty-free, sublicenseable and transferable license to use, reproduce, distribute, 
prepare derivative works of, display, and perform User Submissions [as well as] grant 
each user of the YouTube website a non-exclusive license to access User Submissions 
through the website, and to use, reproduce, distribute, display and perform such User 
Submissions as permitted through the functionality of the website” 
(www.youtube.com/t/terms). 
 
As a result, if a user chooses to ignore the rules of the site, and posts 
copyrighted material without permission, other users can still use this material legally: 
providing that a user does not look to profit financially from using another 
subscriber’s material, they have been granted legal license by the site to re-use any 
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material that they may find within the site.  It then becomes a challenge to determine 
which users are actually infringing on copyright, and those who are legitimately using 
content found within the site.  Apart from this dilemma, as already stated, once a user 
submits a work, YouTube, too, has license over works, which means it is able to 
distribute and broadcast various works for promotion and advertising purposes.  
Whilst site regulations protect users from YouTube and its affiliates profiting directly 
from these works, it does not take into consideration the indirect benefits that they are 
able to achieve, such as in-site advertising.  This advertising has in recent times, 
become so lucrative that some copyright holders no longer attempt to block content, 
but instead have negotiated that YouTube pay them a portion of the revenue generated 
from popular user creations (Howard, 2008). However, none of this would be relevant 
to the argument surrounding copyright, if corporations and legal systems 
acknowledged the primary objectives of why users initially utilised the site. 
 
Research has shown that in general, users are not looking to infringe upon 
copyright, profit from their submissions, or claim original authorship from works 
which utilise protected content (Tushnet, 2007).  One needs to acknowledge that the 
utilisation of these works has generally been an act of critique or celebration by the 
fan, and that consumer culture is witnessing a shift in power; what was “yesterday’s 
fan culture is now today’s popular culture” (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2008: 1).  
Obviously each case needs to be investigated independently, but the general trend is 
that users offer alternative or celebratory interpretations of the original works that 
they engage with.  As already discussed, each individual will interpret a text in a 
unique and different way from any other reader.  So by making any text public, an 
author “cedes some control over it” (Tushnet, 2007: 67), because it is not necessarily 
read in the way it was originally intended.  A site like YouTube consequently gives 
fans the opportunity to express their interpretations of various works, in an open 
forum which encourages further interpretation and open sharing. 
 
Many promoters of participatory video indicate that this type of media should 
fall under the doctrine of fair use (Tushnet, 2007).  Generally, users who are able to 
prove that their work adds new insight into the material to which it refers, are able to 
claim fair use of the material.  Critics of this argument state that manipulating 
copyrighted material in various ways, could harm the author’s moral rights, because 
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viewers could not only incorrectly interpret the work as being associated with the 
original author, but that this interpretation could defame the moral character of the 
author.  However, it has been discovered that this is hardly ever the case, because “the 
fan makes no ownership or authorship claims to the characters or situations” 
(Tushnet, 2007: 66).  It could be argued that at times, corporations treat users as 
passive absorbers of content, rather than critical and educated media consumers.  But 
this type of interaction by media consumers indicates that those who consume these 
newly edited varieties of copyrighted content are well aware that they are linked to the 
creative mindset of individual users, and not the corporation or individual who owns 
the copyrighted work. 
 
Manipulated and collaborated videos should rather be seen as the ability of the 
consumer “to express their own identities through association and transformation” 
(Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2008: 6).  As with so many new media technologies, the 
opportunity to share and collaborate leads users toward creating an online identity 
with which to interact.  It only stands to reason that in a world which is defined by the 
media which we consume, individuals feel the need to incorporate various media 
formats into their online personas.  Participatory video ultimately allows users the 
opportunity to express fully who they are by displaying that which has shaped their 
overall being.  Therefore one should question how it is possible to copyright, and 
grant a monopoly, over something that moulds persona, and is so intrinsic to the 
postmodern identity. 
 
Some have argued that participatory communication within the online realm 
has helped create vast imagined communities with whom individual users are able to 
interact (Howard, 2008).  By doing so, users are required to find their own unique 
vernacular with which to navigate this new society.  There are a number of different 
ways in which users are contributing to the “multiplicity of voices speaking in the 
non-institutional discursive spaces of quotidian life” (Howard, 2008: 493).  One of the 
most evident ways that this is being achieved is through the process of digital 
mashing, and their display within sites such as YouTube.  Some may argue that these 
hybrid forms of media are merely gross mutilations of popular culture; however, 
before one begins to criticise the action of users, one should acknowledge that this 
type of hybridisation has become a natural occurrence within most aspects of digital 
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life.  Technology itself has become hybridised (think of the convergence between 
cellular phones, digital cameras and personal digital assistants to create the 
Blackberry); therefore it only becomes natural that that which digital technology 
communicates becomes hybridised (Bolter, 2006). 
 
This adheres to the idea that when examining postmodern culture, the 
traditional rules which govern community spaces have reconstituted themselves, and 
been re-territorialised in ways which do not conform to the norms stipulated by high 
modern society (Gupta & Ferguson, 1992).  As such, users need to find new ways in 
which to navigate these new territories, in ways which mimic the institutional 
structures of the postmodern.  Rosemary Coombe (1998) argues that all individuals 
are bound by the cultural contexts in which they find themselves to exist, and as such, 
will adapt to the convergence of technologies, and the hybridisation of global cultures, 
by adopting these traits into their day-to-day existence.  One can observe through 
current cultural trends, that globally individuals are relating more closely with the 
images of popular Western culture than their own as these “images so pervasively 
permeate all dimensions of our daily lives” (Coombe, 1998: 52).  Consequently, 
identities are being shaped by the popular more so than the traditional national 
ideologies of the past.   Therefore, one could argue that the collaboration of online 
digital media, on a site such as YouTube, is no more than an expression of identity 
within the newly emerging social culture of convergence and multiplicity. 
 
Apart from the revelation that a site such as YouTube encourages individual 
identity formation, is the more prevalent argument that it provides a platform to 
openly share individual interpretations of various works, as well as allowing users an 
open forum to disseminate ideas, which previously would have remained unheard.  In 
previous eras, this type of exposure “has been the preserve of marketers and political 
consultants” (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2008: 2), and yet YouTube has enabled individuals 
the opportunity to air various works which contain important cultural messages.  
Many would declare that this is an outlandish statement to make; however, if one 
considers that the majority of YouTube videos which contain copyrighted material are 
satirical in nature (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2008), it becomes a very relevant point.  For 
centuries, satire has been a tool implemented by various commentators to create a 
critical inquiry into various forms of society, using varying degrees of “mockery, 
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ridicule, and wit to make a moral point” (Navratil 2007: 215).  Consequently, 
YouTube has given online users the opportunity to take various pieces of popular 
culture, and transform them into something which in turn, comments on the culture 
from which it originated. 
 
The strict implementation of copyright on YouTube could be viewed as 
denigrating the role of satire within the cyber-realm, in a sense undermining the basic 
premise of the Internet – that it acts as a free and open democracy.  Satire is an 
important component of any democracy, and “unlike traditional news, which claims 
an epistemological certainty, satire is a disclosure of inquiry, a rhetoric of challenge 
that seeks through the asking of unanswered questions to clarify the underlying 
morality of a situation” (Baym, 2005 cited in Navratil, 2007: 215).  Whilst many may 
argue that the Internet is free from any form of governance, thus negating any need 
for satirical comment, the Internet is still strictly controlled and monitored in a 
number of ways.  It is true that the Internet is not owned or governed by any one 
nation state.  However, because global corporations have made this virtual world the 
home of consumerism and popular culture, it could be argued that these corporations 
are the governance which control online user behaviour and content. 
 
It therefore only becomes natural human reaction to formulate ways in which 
to comment upon this culture and governance.  As is the norm for those in power, 
there is an attempt to stifle that which is critical of their power and control.  One could 
argue that the use of copyright in modern times has shifted toward a type of 
hegemonic battle between those in control of knowledge, and those attempting to curb 
the monopolisation of intellectual property.  It has been established that users of 
YouTube do not look to profit from mash-up productions, and yet many creators of 
popular culture criticise these productions as infringing upon traditional intellectual 
property rights.  Ultimately, copyright has become a tool to censor the voices of those 
who attempt to unbalance the axis of intellectual control, and is most visibly noticed 
when videos are pulled from the site, citing copyright infringement as a reason.  For 
example, one of the videos analysed in Chapter 6 of this dissertation, Toy Story 2 
Requiem, was pulled from the site and a message was displayed stating that it had 
been removed due to issues of copyright – it has subsequently been reinstated.  
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One of the greatest tools that YouTube uses in order to prevent piracy among 
its users is to limit videos to a maximum of ten minutes per clip, in an attempt to 
thwart users’ from broadcasting full copies of movies and television programmes.  
The few users who still attempt to broadcast illegal versions of mainstream media, are 
forced to upload these videos in a multitude of parts, generally a practice which is too 
demanding and time consuming for users to undertake (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2008).  
As a result, companies and owners of various popular media are protected, for the 
most part, from online pirates who may undermine the profits that could be made by 
authentic owners and broadcasters.  This leads one to question, if copyright owners 
are protected from mass piracy in an environment such as YouTube, why has it 
become an almost incessant need, by these owners, to block individuals from creating 
and sharing short pieces of collaborated media? 
 
As previously mentioned, the issue surrounding copyright is not one of 
maintaining profits, but one of maintaining control over popular culture.  Forcing 
YouTube to remove short satirical clips containing copyrighted material could be 
interpreted as censoring those who wish to comment on the role of popular culture 
within society.  Even those clips which are not satirical in nature, but which contain 
aspects of other material, often point to interesting aspects which reflect postmodern 
society.  Such an example would be the video clip Mika – Relax take it easy (Michael 
Prince & Klash-E Mix) which highlights the fragmentation of identity which has 
resulted from postmodernity, as it cuts and remixes a variety of different animated 
movies, such as Madagascar, Chicken Little, and Happy Feet to name a few, into a 
larger more complex musical clip.  This will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 6.   
 
Currently, if a user chooses to utilise media taken from mainstream popular 
culture, such as Disney cartoons for example, Disney will attempt to gag its broadcast.  
This ensures that they do not have direct competition, whilst simultaneously 
guaranteeing that any production which appears to deviate from the ideologies that 
Disney present are undermined and deemed to be illegal practice, such as Toy Story 2 
Requiem, thus reinforcing the Disney monopoly and downplaying those ideologies 
which may displace current dominant ideals.  By instilling copyright too harshly and 
thereby censoring these creations, one could argue that society is not only being 
continually shaped and maintained by those in power, but that the voices which could 
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assist in moving society in a different direction, are being drowned out, and carefully 
manipulated to appear as deviant behaviour, thus ensuring that global society adheres 

































Chapter Five – Research Methodology: 
 
 5.1  Introduction 
 
This research has already outlined many arguments surrounding copyright and 
intellectual property rights within the online realm.  These arguments, and the 
methods outlined in the following chapter, will be used in conjunction in an attempt to 
answer the main research question of this dissertation: has copyright become an 
unethical and obsolete practice within the culture of new media technologies and mass 
collaboration?  Using a number of digitally mashed videos found on YouTube, this 
dissertation hopes to shed light on this very contentious issue.  However, due to the 
highly philosophical nature of the proposed question, one cannot explore this problem 
through any one form of standard media research.  Therefore, this chapter will 
examine various aspects of standard research theory, in an attempt to outline an 
appropriate methodology.  This methodology should aid in determining if the videos 
discussed in the following chapter, are infringing on copyright, or if they are a 
necessary cultural development within postmodern society. 
 
Therefore, this chapter begins with a discussion of the benefits of using 
interpretivism as the primary methodological appraoch, in an effort to highlight how 
knowledge cannot be understood without understanding the societal consciousness 
from which it emerges.  Once this has been established, this chapter will continue by 
outlining the way in which sample cases were chosen.   In an attempt to explain the 
significance of the material used by YouTube users within each mash-up, this chapter 
will proceed to discuss aspects of textual and discourse analysis.  By doing so, it will 
establish an explanation of how these videos can be viewed and interpreted by 
viewers, as well as theorise why this type of content is significant within the 
postmodern culture.  Therefore, the analysis to follow in Chapter 6, and the 
conceptual research discussed in previous chapters, should provide a solid framework 






5.2  The Benefits of Interpretivism   
 
In order to help strengthen and justify the theoretical research already 
undertaken, this sub-section will explore interpretivism, which has been deemed to be 
the most relevant methodological approach in terms of this dissertation, thus one 
should be able to identify how the case studies used within this dissertation are a 
result of the social culture with which users find themselves to be interacting.  
However, prior to the discussion concerning the selection of case samples, it is 
imperative to discuss this approach, in order to explore how, through a process of 
social inquiry into YouTube users, one is able to validate their online social action, as 
well as determine the social context of this interaction (Sarantakos, 2005).   
 
Interpretivism is a philosophy which explores how the construction of society 
is “a social creation, constructed in the minds of people and reinforced through their 
interactions with each other” (Denscombe: 2010: 121).  It has been decided, that in 
terms of this research, interpretivism is the most useful methodological orientation, 
because it effectively contributes in determining how digital mash-ups add to the 
social creation of culture.  However, this methodology has certain drawbacks which 
limit the scope that social structures themselves play in the formation of cultural 
thinking.  As such, one must also keep in mind that the “media are central to the 
organisation of meaning at both a social and a personal level” (Deacon et al, 1999: 8).  
Importantly, one must firstly acknowledge that social structures “are always enabling 
as well as constraining” (Deacon et al, 1999: 9), meaning that these structures provide 
both resources and an environment which are be utilised by society; yet, 
simultaneously, these structures are limited through both feasibility and what is 
realistically possible.  Secondly, it must be highlighted that all “relations between 
situated actions and general formations, local choices and prevailing circumstances 
are dynamic and two-way” (Deacon et al, 1999: 9), indicating that interaction is 
determined by social structures, whilst concurrently demonstrating that these social 
structures are in turn determined by various forms of communication.  
 
Using this approach, the researcher aims to understand how people make sense 
of the world, and how they assign meanings to that which they find within it 
(Sarantakos, 2005).  Therefore, needs to be investigated how various conditions, 
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cultural beliefs, and varying social orders, play a part when attempting to understand 
how social structures and situations are created and expressed through language, 
imagery, and social rituals (Deacon et al, 1999).  As such, one of the most important 
ways in which one is able to achieve this, is by taking a reflective approach to these 
constructs, and assessing people’s “reconstructed impressions of the world” 
(Sarantakos, 2005: 39).  One must be aware of the underpinning influences that social 
structures play in shaping one’s subjectivities, and as such this research aims to 
construct a reflective interpretation of the ways in which these subjectivities are 
displayed and integrated into the phenomena of digital mash-up.  Interpretivism can 
be viewed as the most useful methodological approach in determining this because, as 
Crotty (1998: 67) indicates, it aims to explore the “culturally derived and historically 
situated interpretations of the social life-world”.   Therefore, one needs to explore 
how a person creates meaning regarding their social world through their own 
interpretations of various institutional structures, and acknowledge that these 
structures cannot be interpreted as independent entities.  This research, consequently, 
attempts to identify and understand YouTube users’ perspectives and engagement with 
their social reality.  It assumes that there is a commonality amongst users and their 
experiences and as such, aims to explore that which “is invariable across all 
manifestations of the phenomenon” (Tesch, 1994: 147 cited in Ertmer, 1997: 162).  
As such, this research explores the engagement of users within the postmodern social 
structures of the online, identifying how they have internalised these ideals, and 
highlighting how users have created videos which epitomise and match the norms of 
these structures.   
 
 5.3  Case Sampling 
 
It has been established that interpretivism will be the most beneficial method 
to use whilst investigating the various case studies.  However, in order to qualify this 
approach, very specific samples must be examined.  Therefore, it has been determined 
that the most apt sampling technique to use is that of non-probability.  Non-
probability, or non-random sampling, aims to investigate a number of cases which 
display distinct characteristics of the issue being investigated (Sarantakos, 2005), as 
well as being non-restrictive in the number of samples which one can use in the study.  
There are a number of varying techniques which fall under this category; however, 
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due to the link which has been drawn between this research and interpretivism, it has 
been decided that the most relevant method to use is that of purposive sampling.  As 
such, “researchers must learn to take their own cues from the participants’ 
expressions, questions, and occasional sidetracks” (Ertmer, 1997: 162).  
 
Purposive sampling, also known as typical-case sampling, seeks to explore 
cases which epitomize the key features of that which is being investigated (Deacon et 
al, 1999).  In order to do this, the first thing which must be established, is what typical 
behaviour actually constitutes.  Only once this has been identified does it become 
possible to choose which samples will be the most beneficial to the study.  Ideally, 
this dissertation wants to explore the art of digital mashing and the variety of ways in 
which it is undertaken in an attempt to determine how it corresponds and relates to the 
larger social discourses within postmodern society.  Subsequently, the videos which 
have been selected are those which try to de-stabilise the primary meanings of 
copyrighted works through the process of digital mashing.  In terms of this research, 
the aim is to investigate if users are infringing on copyright by using the work of 
mainstream media, in an attempt to create their own new digital mash-up.   
 
Therefore, the videos which have been selected had to contain various 
copyrighted media which have been used without authorisation from copyright 
holders.  However, apart from this, the videos chosen could not just be those which 
infringed upon copyright, such as full extracts from movies; instead they needed to 
demonstrate that they utilise at least two different types of copyrighted media to 
create a new variation of video.    Added to this, because this research concentrates on 
the intellectual property laws of the United States and South Africa, it was decided 
that the samples to be examined should, therefore, only be those which had been 
designed by users from these two countries; thus allowing a comparative study to 
occur between the two countries, both in terms of their sample content, and in terms 
of the respective national laws governing intellectual property. 
 
However, this non-random sampling served only to formulate the frame from 
which to draw a number of randomly selected samples.  Random sampling, unlike 
non-random sampling, “is where each sample element is selected on a random basis 
from the sampling frame” (Deacon et al, 1999: 48).  In terms of this research, a 
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variety of examples were selected from the designated pool through the YouTube 
search engine using the keywords “mash-up”, “movie”, “cartoon”, and 
“collaboration”.  The results from this search, which corresponded correctly with the 
frame established through the non-random sampling, were then used to establish 
viable case studies for this dissertation.  As with most qualitative research, this 
dissertation is concerned more with illustrating broader social and cultural processes 
than with establishing a representative sample of YouTube users.  As such, the sample 
size will be determined as the analysis progresses, stopping once a saturation point 
has been reached; ultimately once the data stops revealing new information, and 
results begin to repeat themselves (Deacon et al, 1999).  However, due to the wide 
variety of mash-up videos which are available, four separate categories of videos will 
be examined to ensure a depth of information.  These categories include videos which 
mimic the formula of traditional music videos, those which incorporate film clips into 
their production, ones in which alternative narratives are created, and those which 
incorporate satire and parody. 
 
 5.4  Analysis 
 
While it has been determined how the empirical data for this research will be 
selected, it is only through the analysis of this information that any valid conclusions 
can be drawn.  It was established earlier in this chapter that the aim of this dissertation 
is to analyse both the structures involved in the production of samples, as well as the 
way in which YouTube users employ these structures, in an attempt to explore if there 
is a social need for copyright laws to change.  The samples selected will be analysed 
in a number of different ways in an attempt to draw a viable and valid conclusion to 
the overall research question of this dissertation.  Initially, a structural analysis will be 
done.  This process will explore the basic patterns and trends inherent within each 
video in an attempt to identify commonalities between each video (Sarantakos, 2005).  
This opening analysis will in no way aim to evaluate the meanings or messages 
contained within each text, but instead will concentrate on identifying the common 




This will be followed by a latent content analysis which, unlike traditional 
content analyses that concentrates on identifying the number of times a specific 
phenomenon occurs, investigates the way in which messages are deconstructed and 
reconstructed, in an attempt to explore and understand both the meanings of the work, 
as well as the impact that the structures, identified during the course of the structural 
analysis, have had on the construction of the case studies. Once this has been 
established, a basic discourse analysis will ensue.  In accordance with Deacon et al 
(1999: 152), “discourse analysis can be understood as an attempt to show systematic 
links between texts, discourse practices, and sociocultural practices.”  Consequently, a 
discourse analysis will investigate the relationship between the data uncovered during 
the course of the prior two analyses, and determine what impact, if any, postmodern 
culture has had on the formation of these videos.  Once all of this has been 
investigated, one should have a viable platform from which to formulate credible 
conclusions concerning the issue of copyright in connection with these types of digital 
creations, subsequently determining if they are indeed infringing upon the rights of 
authors, with swift protective action needed in the event of such infringement, or 
whether they are an important social aspect of postmodern culture.       
 
         
 



















As outlined in the previous chapter, there are a number of varying factors 
which play a role in shaping and constructing all forms of media.  This chapter aims 
to take the various conceptual analyses outlined in earlier chapters, along with the 
methods outlined in chapter five, and determine if digital mash-ups found within the 
YouTube site are indeed infringing upon the traditional copyright laws of South Africa 
and the United States, or if based on these analyses, whether or not copyright law 
needs to be thought of in a new way.  This will be done through an exploration of the 
evolution of digital mash-ups within four discrete sections.  Firstly, it will start with 
an analysis of videos which relate closely to the sampling techniques of rap artists 
during the early nineties.  These videos highlight how users began creating clips using 
various parts of music videos to create their own rendition of popular music videos 
and songs.  Secondly, it will move toward highlighting videos into which movie clips 
have been incorporated, whilst discussing the ramifications that this plays on the 
traditional discourses associated with such media.  Thirdly, this chapter will examine 
those videos which have developed their own unique storylines by utilising various 
parts of mainstream media clips, in order to create an alternative reading of traditional 
media discourses.  Finally, this chapter will explore the role of parody and satire 
within digital mash-up, in order to demonstrate the importance that this type of video 
plays within the commentary of postmodern society and culture.  Each of these 
sections will attempt to determine why creators have chosen to link various videos 
together, and if they have used sound skilled knowledge in doing so, thus justifying 
the infringement of traditional intellectual property laws; or if each of the videos 
examined are just haphazardly put together without any real meaning or reasoning, 
apart from infringing on copyright laws.       
 
 6.2  Early Mash-ups 
 
As mentioned in chapter two, music sampling began in the early nineties 
whereby, rap artists would often use the melody of established songs to create a 
starting point from which they would rap their own lyrics, in order to create “new 
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montages of sound” (Vaidhyanthan, 2001: 15), such as Vanilla Ice’s Ice Ice Baby 
which utilises the music from Queen’s Under Pressure to underline his lyrics.  At this 
stage in music sampling, original artists were not consulted or paid for the use of their 
music, and as such, music sampling was deemed to be copyright theft.  Digital 
mashing, however, is rooted in this tradition.  When one begins to examine the origins 
of video collaboration, it is evident that users were inspired in similar ways, utilising 
the music from one video, and then incorporating the lyrics and images from another.  
One of the best examples of this, is taken from the video Smooth Buster, in which 
Michael Jackson’s video Smooth Criminal is injected with the melody from the 
Ghostbusters title track.  The lyrics of the song Smooth Criminal are then matched 
with this music, in order to create a new variation of the song and video. 
 
Initially this type of mashing was celebrated by music critics, often finding a 
niche audience on television stations such as MTV, which will be discussed in more 
detail at the end of this chapter.  However, as this newly emergent art form began to 
gain popularity amongst audiences, music corporations deemed many of the videos to 
be illegal, and like non-credited music sampling, had most digital mash-ups pulled 
from commercial television (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2008).  Reasons often cited were, 
as with sampling, that these videos were in no way original, and merely copied two 
already established music videos.  However, if one examines the Smooth Buster 
video, there is evidence that even in early forms of digital mash-ups, creators were not 
trying intentionally to infringe upon copyright, but rather wanted to create intertextual 
links between various videos, and in turn, create their own distinct take on various 
forms of popular culture.  Still 1 is a clip taken from the Ghostbusters music video 






One of the first noticeable things about the clip is that the Ghostbusters 
characters, and the lead singer in the video, are mimicking aspects from the well-
known Michael Jackson Thriller video.  The Ghostbusters movie came out during the 
height of Michael Jackson’s success during the late eighties, and so one can assume 
that the viewers who saw the Ghostbusters video initially would have understood the 
meta-narrative created by the video directors.  In the Thriller video, Michael Jackson 
is seen leading a group of zombies and other supernatural beings in a dance sequence, 
and consequently this clip portrays the Ghostbusters, in a sense, parodying that which 
was associated with the celebration of paranormal beings in Thriller. 
 
This video can be interpreted in three distinct ways, either of which could justify the 
apparent infringement of copyrighted material.  Firstly, it must be considered that the 
mash-up being examined was produced in 2006, over ten years after the production of 
both Ghostbusters and Smooth Criminal.  As such, it can be argued that the creator 
has a somewhat high degree of historical knowledge pertaining to Michael Jackson 
and popular music culture by utilising videos so long after they were initially made.   
The creator must also be accredited as having sound musical knowledge, in order to 
create any form of melodic cohesion between the two soundtracks.  Therefore, it 
could be said that this type of mashing demands a user to be somewhat proficient in 
sound engineering, just as those who engaged in sampling techniques during the early 
nineties were. 
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Secondly, as was explained earlier through the work of Aufderheide and Jaszi 
(2008), many creators of digital mash-ups are often part of a fan culture, who aim to 
celebrate various performers and aspects of popular culture through their digital 
creations.  One could argue that defining this video as an example of fan culture, is a 
somewhat tenuous claim to make.  After all, just placing a music video online does 
not make one a fan.  However, some may argue that because of the links identified 
above, in which the user chooses to incorporate clips which make reference to the 
Michael Jackson Thriller video, this particular user is in part celebrating the influence 
that Michael Jackson has had not only on him as a fan, but on popular culture at large.  
This is further emphasised by the portion of the clip which shows a young boy 
emulating Jackson’s dance moves, thus demonstrating how Jackson has become an 
inherent cultural figure. 
           
Whilst it is true that the YouTube user who created this video has utilised large 
portions of well-known established musical works, there are a number of arguments 
which can be drawn out by the above discussion to justify their doing so, and in turn, 
undermine the illegality of producing such a video.  As was discussed in Chapter 3, 
infringement occurs when anybody copies and uses a copyrighted work without the 
express prior consent of the author, and whilst it is evident that this user has done so, 
they are well within their rights to do so due to the doctrines of fair use, found within 
both South African and American law, which outlines a number of exceptions in 
terms of the use of intellectual property. 
 
Both South African and America law stipulate that a person is allowed to 
utilise the works of others, provided that they are not in any direct competition with 
the original artist.  American law, specifically, deems the use of others’ intellectual 
property without their consent to be legal, provided that the use of their work did not 
result in any form of retail or financial loss.  Included in this clause, the person who 
has appropriated the copyrighted material should not have found any personal 
financial success from the production of their work.  It would be rather presumptuous 
to assume that the creator of the Smooth Buster video would have profited from his 
work in any way.  If he was aiming to achieve some form of financial success from 
his mix, it is doubtful that he would have freely and openly shared his video on a site 
such as YouTube.  This is emphasised by research done by Aufderheide and Jaszi 
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(2007), who found that many YouTube users do not place work online unless they are 
prepared for their work to be shared and copied by other users.  Therefore, it could be 
postulated that this video was created by a user who was celebrating Michael Jackson 
as both a performer and artist. 
 
Finally, however, it can be argued that this video has far more intrinsic value in terms 
of social commentary than mere fandom.  As mentioned, this video was made in 
2006, a year after Jackson was embroiled in a legal battle regarding child molestation, 
an accusation that had surfaced before during the mid-90’s.  It could be theorized 
therefore, that Smooth Buster is making direct commentary on these issues.  In the 
Smooth Criminal video, Jackson can be seen as adopting the role of the hero.  He 
stands out in a white suit – a colour generally associated in film with the light, pure 
character of the hero – as he defends the women in the club from the darkly clad 
mafia-type men.  The words of the song seem to reinforce the notion that Jackson is 
the hero, as he describes how an intruder attacks the title female character, and how 
he proceeds to question the nature of her attack in an attempt to avenge her. 
 
Therefore, it can be speculated that, in light of the allegations brought against 
Jackson, the creator of the Smooth Buster video is playing on the irony of Jackson 
being depicted as a vigilante hero.  However, one would be unaware of this without 
the inclusion of a number of important elements.  Firstly, by juxtaposing Smooth 
Criminal with images and melody from the Ghostbusters music video, the creator 
appears to be highlighting the role that the Ghostbusters play, that of catching and 
detaining evil spirits.  As such, one could assume that by combining these images, the 
creator is playing on the idea of Jackson being “bust” by the authorities.  Secondly, 
the character played by Jackson in the Smooth Criminal video cannot be viewed as 
wholly good, but more as a vigilante with sinister undertones.  While Jackson is 
depicted wearing white, it is still in the same style as the other gangster figures 
depicted in the video, thus indicating that he is still part of the gangster underworld.  
He appears to be a leader within this underworld, with whom all control rests as he 
directs attention, as seen at the beginning of the clip in which the club only “comes 
alive” after he arrives.  Even when engaging in a bar brawl, he is not threatened by 
any of the other male figures, thus indicating his power and their respect for him. 
 76
Finally, the most important element of this video which highlights and 
reinforces the creator’s notion of Jackson’s sinister and corrupt nature, takes place at 
the beginning of the clip.  As already mentioned, as the video cuts from the shot of the 
Ghostbusters to Michael Jackson the creator has inserted a brief clip taken from 
Jackson’s Black and White video, in which a young boy can be seen emulating his 
dance moves.  This could be interpreted as a direct reference to the molestation 
charges brought against Jackson.  Because the clip is situated between that of the 
Ghostbusters clip and the introduction of Jackson, it seems to infer that is the boy 
which links the good of the Ghostbusters to the sinister underworld that Jackson is 
found in.  It can be argued that the emulation of Jackson by the boy, is an example of 
how Jackson has infiltrated the psyche of the boy, and demonstrates his influence over 
the boy.  The video informs the audience of Jackson’s sinister nature by placing him 
within a gangster underworld, most commonly associated with prostitution and 
extortion, and as such, it becomes the role of the Ghostbusters to expel Jackson’s 
corrupting spirit from the boy. 
 
Therefore, this video creates an important social comment in regard to one of 
the most affluent figures within popular culture.  In light of this, it becomes difficult 
to claim that the protection of copyright is of greater importance than the right of the 
author to make a creative, but valid contribution to the public sphere of cultural 
knowledge.  Both the United States and South Africa are democratic nations which 
should ideally aim to promote free speech amongst their citizens.  If one was to stifle 
this type of work, and not allow citizens the opportunity to interact with the 
knowledge that popular culture provides, would in effect be an infringement of free 
speech, thus resulting in void democracies. 
 
Aside from the issue of free speech, American law stipulates that artistic 
creations are permitted to be modified if it is deemed that the newer creation is part of 
the “inherent nature of the materials” (Circular 92 – Copyright Law of the United 
States, Title 17 of the US Code).  This, in part, appears to validate the practice of 
digital mashing because the process of producing and consuming digital media has 
become an inherent quality of the Internet and the development of digital culture .  
Therefore, one cannot stifle this type of creation as it undermines the basic premise of 
online development.  Apart from this, if one examines the clause which defines 
 77
copyright in both laws, one finds the word “originality”.  As aspects of this 
dissertation have already stated, it becomes very difficult to pinpoint much within 
popular culture that is wholly original, and the creator of the Smooth Buster video has 
highlighted this point quite sufficiently, if unintentionally.  Still 1 has already 
demonstrated the intertexuality between the itself and the Thriller video, but if one 
examines Still 2, a second clip taken from the Smooth Buster video, you can see that 
much of the mise-en-scène, such as the smoky bar atmosphere, and suits, have been 





To take this point even further, the Thriller video which is parodied within the 
Ghostbusters video, was a parody itself in regard to the horror movie industry.  
However, no one would question the legality of ‘borrowing’ these ideas and 
structuring them around these mainstream videos.  Popular culture is based on the 
understanding of various meta-narratives and intertextual references (Coombe, 1998), 
a point which was emphasised while exploring the nature of Disney cartoons in 
Chapter 2.   Therefore, one can argue that this early digital mash-up is merely an 
extension of this type of created culture, lending itself to the formation of today’s 






6.3 The Emergence of Film Mash-ups 
 
Before one can start exploring the notion of today’s postmodern culture, 
however, it is first necessary to examine those videos which have transcended from 
the pure synchronisation of music videos, to those which mesh music soundtracks and 
video images to create a user’s own brand of music video.  Some may argue that 
merely placing a soundtrack over a number of video clips, which have been edited 
together, does not constitute skill or originality, and subsequently infringes on 
copyright.  This would be the case, if not for a number of other factors which play a 
part in the creation of such mash-ups.  Two variations of these types of videos will be 
looked at: Mika – Relax, take it easy (Michael Prince & Klash-E Mix) and Michael 
Jackson – Thriller (Monster Mash-Up).  Each video is a combination of images and 
clips taken from a number of movies and viral Internet videos1 which have been 
overlaid with a song, in order to create a video which is different from that which was 
originally made for that specific piece of music. 
   
However, it can be argued that the creators of these videos were not always 
intentionally trying to create new music videos.  One could presume that the music 
used within each video aims to emphasise the visuals within each of the clips, in turn 
aiding in celebrating the movies from which they have utilised various images.  When 
examining the Mika – Relax video, for instance, each of the clips, used by the 
creators, are from a variety of animated films, such as Madagascar, Chicken Little, 
Shrek, Happy Feet, Barnyard, Flushed Away, Ice Age 2, and Over the Hedge, as well 
as a handful of other viral online animations taken from YouTube.  The clips have 
been edited together in such a way that it appears as if the characters are dancing 
along with the music chosen by the video creators, as seen in Still 3. 
 
                                                 
1 A video clip which has amassed widespread popularity through the process of online sharing, usually 




     
Andrew Goodwin (1992) indicates that a music video is a medium generally 
driven by the way in which the visuals interact with the music being played, usually 
illustrating, or amplifying the words of the song.  Through illustration, visuals within 
music videos tend to match the lyrics and general tone of a song, in order to tell a 
story which link directly to the lyrics, whilst amplification, on the other hand, 
attempts to develop the visuals beyond the basic meaning of a song, and create greater 
meaning for the music.  If one chooses to apply this theory to the Mika – Relax video, 
it becomes evident that there is very little which makes it a music video, apart from 
the fact that it has a song overlaying the visual images.  One could replace this music 
with any multitude of other songs, and the result would be the same: a montage of 
dancing animated characters.  
 
Therefore, it can be concluded that the creators were not trying to design a true 
music video, and one should rather concentrate on identifying what other reasons may 
exist for such a work to be made.  One such reason, as already mentioned, is that this 
video was created to celebrate the vast number of animated works displayed within it.  
As discussed when looking at the Smooth Buster video, creators of such videos must 
have considerable knowledge of a specific genre or aspect of popular culture, in order 
to create a meaningful form of fan culture.  In regard to the Mika - Relax video, it can 
be acknowledged that the creators of the video display a depth of knowledge in 
relation to digital animations.  One would need to know each of the movies and 
animations used within the video fairly well, in order to arrange such specific scenes 
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into a coherent whole.  Certain clips contained in this video, for instance, are often 
taken from extended versions of movies found only within DVD editions, such as Still 





It could be argued that the concept of fan culture driving individuals to make 
these types of videos is further emphasised if one examines the Monster Mash-Up 
video.  This video appears to commemorate the horror genre, with a number of 
extracts taken from an abundance of horror movies, such as Frankenstein, Halloween, 
Chuckie, Wolf, The Exorcist, Dracula, Psycho, Scream, Silence of the Lambs, The 
Birds, Nightmare on Elm Street, Ghostbusters, Gremlins, One Missed Call, I Know 
What You Did Last Summer, Jaws, It, An American Werewolf in Paris, Identity, 
Sleepy Hollow, Arachnophobia, Lake Placid, Alien, The Shining, Predator, The 
Others and 30 Days of Night.  The video also uses the song Thriller for its soundtrack, 
which as already discussed, celebrates the horror genre within its own music video, 
and the creator has inserted a “Happy Halloween” graphic at the end of the video.  
Unlike the previous video however, the music used within Monster Mash-Up helps to 
illustrate the words of the song, so in essence does conform to the structure of a 
traditional music video, as outlined by Goodwin (1992), such as matching the line 
“There ain’t no second chance against the thing with forty eyes” with images from 
Arachnophobia, and “It’s close to midnight and something evil’s lurking in the dark” 
with an image of a Gremlin closing a sewer cover as it escapes underground. 
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However, unlike early mash-ups, which concentrated primarily on creating a 
new soundtrack amplified by the visuals of original music videos, videos like Monster 
Mash-Up are far more concerned with creating new visuals which are amplified by 
the music in order to create some form of social commentary.  While it can be argued 
that the song Thriller could have been replaced by any number of similar themed 
songs, such as Monster Mash and Highway to Hell, the way in which the creator has 
linked the visuals to the lyrics makes it difficult to assume that another song would 
create the same effect.  Apart from this, this video can also be interpreted as playing 
on the sinister undertones of the media in regard to Jackson and child molestation.  
Therefore, this video is not solely concerned with being a music video, but can also be 
interpreted as creating a comment on popular culture.   
 
In the initial music video created for Thriller, Michael Jackson is seen 
transforming into a monster.  It can therefore be argued that the creator of the Monster 
Mash-up video plays on the irony of this depiction because it was after charges of 
molestation were brought against Jackson that many media outlets labelled him as a 
“monster” of society (Glaister, 2005).  This irony is further emphasised when one 
investigates the overall meaning of the Thriller lyrics.  The song implies that everyone 
has a dark side which cannot always be resisted, as emphasised by the line: “For no 
mere mortal can resist/The evil of the thriller”.  Therefore, Monster Mash-Up, while 
highlighting aspects of fan culture which can justify its use of various media, more 
importantly demonstrates its importance as a social tool aiding in the process of 
designing a democratic online public sphere.  However, these are not the only factors 
which determine the legality of digital mash-ups.     
 
Within American law, one of the most overriding factors which influence the 
use of copyrighted images, is if whether or not using these images or sound 
recordings create a financial disadvantage for the original creator.  It is unlikely that 
the creation of either of these two videos would have undermined the profits from any 
of the production houses responsible for the creation of the movies and musical 
soundtracks used within them.  It is more likely, as Vaidhyathan (2001) claims, that 
this type of interaction with popular culture has revitalised interest in older forms of 
media, such as the popularity regained by Aerosmith after Run-DMC sampled their 
song Walk this Way in 1986.  Based on this premise, it can be assumed that these 
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videos have helped elevate “lost” media back to the forefront of modern society, and 
overall helped to increase the financial rewards for those that own the copyrights, as 
they regain popularity amongst media consumers.  Apart from this, the manner in 
which users are interacting with culture, in terms of the way in which they design 
mash-ups, does seem to fall within the exceptions of copyright, especially in terms of 
American law.  If one consults this law, it can be noted that copyright was designed 
not only to reward authors for their work, but also as a way in which members of 
society were able to “encourage the production of culture” (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 
2008: 2).  As such, these mash-ups can be seen as an example of how users are 
utilising existing popular culture to create different variants of established norms, in 
an effort to navigate and create a space for themselves within the plethora of cultures 
displayed online (Aufderheide & Jaszi, 2008).  This is even more apparent when one 
begins to investigate current videos, in which users have moved away from creating 
musical montages, and who now often create new narratives through the combination 
of different forms of popular culture. 
 
6.4 New Narratives and Popular Culture 
 
As with early mash-ups, which focussed on re-sampling various music videos 
to create new variations, those which create new types of narratives began in a similar 
way.  Users began by isolating the sounds of a specific scene, and then incorporated 
them into a scene from a different television programme or movie; usually a number 
of scenes are required to be edited together in order for the sound to “fit” cohesively.  
Super Friends is one of the more basic examples of this practice, as it does not 
attempt to change the overall meaning of the narrative, but rather takes one of the 
most famous scenes from the television series Friends – in which the characters create 
a quiz to decide who knows each other the best – and incorporates the dialogue into 
the cartoon series, The Justice League, creating the effect that the characters from the 
cartoon are participating in the competition.  
 
Again, this mash-up illustrates that users require specific knowledge 
surrounding that which they choose to manipulate.  However, unlike the mash-ups 
which have already been examined, the knowledge displayed by this user seems to be 
rather rudimentary.  Whilst it is possible to see that a number of scenes have been 
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taken from The Justice League and edited together so that the action in the clip 
appears sequential, it seems that it does not highlight the same depth of knowledge 
displayed by those creators examined earlier.  Unlike the previous videos, in which 
each user displayed a vast amount of understanding in terms of specific genres of 
popular culture, this video merely matches a random sequencing of scenes taken from 
the cartoon series, provided that it corresponded with the dialogue associated with 
specific characters, such as matching Monica’s dialogue with images of Wonder 
Woman when speaking. 
 
However, there are some elements contained within the video which negates 
this premise to a small degree, demonstrating that the user has simple knowledge in 
relation to The Justice League cartoon series.  One such example would be when 
Superman (Ross) tells The Flash (Joey) to “stop it”, as The Flash spins wildly in one 
place.  The creator of this video would have had to know where to find this specific 
visual in order to match it with the dialogue.  Another example is shown in Still 5, in 
which Superman is seen holding a number of cards which helps to anchor the 
dialogue to the visuals, as he is seen as the quizmaster in the contest the characters are 
competing.  This indicates that the creator has taken time and effort in selecting and 
editing specific visual clips together, in order to help emphasise and drive the 
narrative created by the dialogue; however, time and effort do not highlight in-depth 
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This video becomes a very difficult case to defend in terms of its infringement 
of copyright, because the creator does not attempt to change the dialogue in any way, 
and also does not attempt to create anything that is radically different from the scene 
from which the dialogue is appropriated.  Barring the fact that they are superheroes, 
they are still a group of friends attempting to answer questions about each other, in 
order to prove who knows more about whom.  Had the visuals been well-known 
super-villains fighting against an assortment of superheroes, for instance, instead of 
just a group of heroes, it would have created more depth to the storyline, making the 
quiz seem more bizarre, and ultimately creating an alternative take on the rivalry 
between superheroes and their enemies.  Therefore, one could suggest that this is 
infringement because so little has been changed by the creator; however, this type of 
video has in fact facilitated the creation of more sophisticated narratives found within 
mash-up videos.  This video, whilst simple and rudimentary, can be seen as an 
important stepping stone in terms of mash-up video narratives.  Without this type of 
video, many users may not have realised the potential for creating alternative 
renditions of existing narratives; thus Super Friends helps to emphasise the idea that, 
at times, copyright needs to be waivered in order for culture to prosper and develop, 
as was originally envisioned by those who designed copyright law during the 19th 
century (Vaidhyathan, 2001). 
 
Reservoir Turtles and Toy Story 2 Requiem are two examples of videos 
whereby the creators have altered the overall meaning of the narrative through the 
juxtaposition of dialogue and visuals containing oppositional values to one another.  
Each video has been designed in a similar fashion to the Super Friends video, in 
which dialogue has been taken from one media format and incorporated into the 
visual scene of another.  However, unlike Super Friends, in which the creators aimed 
to complement the dialogue by matching it with corresponding visuals, the creators of 
these two videos have edited the clips together in such a way that they have created 
alternate movie trailers which aim to alter the interpretation of the initial narratives 
contained within the appropriated movies. 
 
Reservoir Turtles, for example, brings together the dialogue from the 
Reservoir Dogs movie trailer, and meshes it with the visuals from the Teenage Mutant 
Ninja Turtles movie trailer.  This culmination of media is one which ultimately 
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subverts the meaning behind the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles movie.  This movie is 
based on the highly popular animated children’s television programme in which 
mutated turtles fight crime in New York guided by their leader, a mutated rat called 
Splinter, whereas Reservoir Dogs is a movie which focuses on a criminal gang 
attempting to pull off a large diamond heist, initiated by their leader, Joe.  The creator 
of this clip therefore negates the Turtles traditional role of being crime fighters, and 
creates a trailer in which they are seen as the criminals.  This has been achieved 
firstly, by associating the dialogue of Joe, in which he outlines how the heist is going 
to take place, with visuals of Splinter talking to the Turtles, thus creating the 
impression that they are led by a criminal boss, rather than a wise ninja master.  
Secondly, the creator relates each of the turtles with specific characters from 
Reservoir Dogs – Mr Blue, Mr Orange, Mr Purple and Mr Pink – based on the colour 
of their bandanas, again aiding in the construction of a consistent and believable 
narrative in which the Turtles belong to a criminal gang.  Added to this, the video 
creator has ensured that the viewer is made aware of the Turtles’ callous criminal 
nature through a sequence of dialogue in which Leonardo (Mr Blue) and 
Michelangelo (Mr Orange) discuss how they will cut off the pinkie finger of the 
jeweller, if he refuses to “hand over the diamonds”.   
 
Each of these elements has helped to create a narrative which destabilizes the 
traditional meanings that one would associate with the Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles.  
However, the significance of this interpretation would be meaningless if those who 
viewed it did not have some form of understanding of the media from which it has 
been utilised.  One would also have to be familiar with the plot of Reservoir Dogs in 
order to appreciate how the dialogue has been integrated with the visuals.  As such, 
viewers of this clip would project their own preconceived interpretations of Reservoir 
Dogs and Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles onto this video, and would therefore 
negotiate the meanings surrounding this clip with far greater clarity than one who had 
no prior knowledge of either Reservoir Dogs or Teenage Mutant Ninja Turtles.  Based 
on this argument, one can therefore presume that the creator of this video must have 
good knowledge in regard to the culture which surrounds each of these movies; 
otherwise they would not have been able to subvert the traditional meanings with such 
sophistication and depth. 
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This argument is further supported when examining the video Toy Story 2 
Requiem.  Toy Story 2 was made by the Disney digital animation production house 
Pixar, and as such contains the traditional wholesome family values associated with 
the Disney brand.  However, it has been matched with dialogue from Requiem for a 
Dream, a movie which deals with the effects of various addictions.  This immediately 
seems to undermine those values generally associated with Disney movies, but this 
alternative view is further emphasised by the specific dialogue chosen by the creator 
to work in tandem with the visuals.  The most obvious way in which this is achieved 
is by creating the effect that the Toy Story 2 characters are swearing, thus destabilising 
the wholesome nature of the Disney characters.  The next aspect which aids in the 
creation of an alternate narrative is the link created between the toymaker in Toy Story 
2, and the drug dealers in Requiem for a Dream. 
 
The toymaker is shown creating the character Woody, which is followed by a 
verbal exchange between the characters Woody (Harry) and Buzz (Tyrone), as they 
discuss the benefits of entering the drug trade.  Overall, this sequence seems to imply 
that Woody has been made to become a toy of the drug trade, rather than just a child’s 
toy to be played with, as prescribed by the Disney movie.  Another important aspect 
which the creator has attempted to explore in this video is the concept of entering a 
drugged world of delusion and chaos; however, only if one is familiar with Requiem 
for a Dream is one able to fully understand this metaphor.   
 
Apart from addressing various forms of addiction, Requiem for a Dream 
explores the way in which each character’s addiction forces them into a delusional 
and dream-like world, which ultimately leads to their downfall.  Because this is a state 
of mind, and an experience which becomes very difficult to explain through dialogue, 
the creator of Toy Story 2 Requiem has carefully edited various visuals together in 
slow-motion, in order to try and create a dream-like atmosphere.  Many of the clips 
which have been edited together during this sequence show the characters falling in 
some way, as seen in Still 6, highlighting their fall from reality.  Even more fitting 
however, is that the scene ends with Woody falling into a garbage can, with the lid 
closed on him, thus indicating he has fallen to the lowest possible low, with reality 







More importantly, however, Still 6 depicts Woody falling amongst a number 
of Ace of Spades cards.  The Ace of Spades is often referred to as the death card 
(Friedman, n.d), and as such it can be theorised that the dream-like state which each 
character enters leads to death of reality, which in turn results in their own tragic 
demise.  In addition to the connotation of death, cards are also often associated with 
fragility, as a sudden failure is often compared to a falling house of cards.  This 
metaphor emphasises each character’s fragile state of mind, and how their world is 
seen to crumble around them as they fall deeper into addiction-fuelled delusions.  
 
Again, this accentuates the point that for one to have a full understanding of 
mash-ups of this nature, one is required to have in-depth knowledge surrounding each 
of the media formats.  One could argue, however, that in this instance, one is able to 
understand the alternative meanings created through the dialogue and effects, without 
in-depth knowledge of either medium.  However, only if one is fully aware of the 
main story contained within Requiem for a Dream is one able to identify the 
significance that the game show shown at the beginning of the video has on the 
overall narrative.  In the movie, it is the prospect of participating on a game show 
which sends Sara, the mother of the main character, into a downward spiral of 




If one was not familiar with the movie, one would not be at liberty to 
understand the foreshadowing associated with the game show at the beginning of the 
video.  Her abuse leads to nightmarish hallucinations, and ultimately prevents her 
from seeing that her son and his girlfriend have become heroin addicts and dealers.  
Eventually, this behaviour puts her in a mental hospital where she lives out her dream 
– appearing on the game show and seeing her son as a successful businessman, 
happily married to his girlfriend.  This seems to imply that it is only within the dream-
like utopia of Disney ideology that one is able to truly “live happily ever after”.  It 
must be noted that the creator will assume that those who consume these videos will 
have a certain educational level of understanding in terms of popular culture and 
society, especially in South Africa where most users of new media are affluent and 
well-educated members of society.  Therefore, creators have the luxury of knowing 
that most of their audience will have the cultural understanding needed to negotiate 
the basic principles associated with popular media. So whilst someone who has 
general knowledge in regard to popular culture has the capacity to understand the 
subversive nature of this mash-up, it is only those viewers who have intrinsic 
knowledge of each media format that will understand the preferred interpretation 
offered by the creator.   
 
Overall, this helps to emphasise the point that popular culture is shaped by the 
audiences which engage with it.  Users, who take uniform media products and 
transform them into new renditions, ultimately undermine the traditional dominant 
readings and institutions that are responsible for the creation of mainstream media 
(Fiske & Hartley, 1996).  Consequently, this helps to explain why these institutions 
are so overzealous in regard to copyright protection – without it they lose control, not 
only of the media which they produce, but also in regard to the construction of 
culture, as audiences now have the means to transform it to suit their own needs.  The 
analysis of these videos has shown that media consumers are negotiating the 
construction of culture through the self-conscious play on established dominant media 
in order to produce a variety of oppositional readings.  This practice could be viewed 
as the natural progression of postmodern popular culture, in which audiences are 
continually expected to understand intertextual links between various media forms 
(Poster, 2008).  Therefore, mash-ups of this nature are not infringing on copyright, but 
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are merely aiding in the development of meta-narratives, and re-conceptualising the 
way in which popular culture is created. 
 
Whilst these mash-ups aim to create alternative readings of particular movies, 
they still inherently follow the formulated narrative of another movie through its 
dialogue.  However, this type of video has seen the emergence of works which have 
developed completely independent narratives, such as Buffy vs Twilight.  While the 
creator of this video has utilised a variety of scenes from Twilight, Harry Potter and 
the Goblet of Fire, and Buffy the Vampire Slayer, he does not follow an established 
narrative from any of the productions.  Instead, he concentrates on formulating a 
“what if” scenario, in which he hypothesises what may have ensued if Buffy were to 
meet Edward Cullen.  However, in doing so, it is imperative that the audience has 
preconceived knowledge about each of the characters.  For instance, the clip loses 
meaning if one does not know that Edward Cullen is a vampire, and Buffy is a 
vampire slayer.  This information is crucial in terms of understanding the overall 
narrative. 
 
This narrative concentrates on exploring what may have happened had Edward 
Cullen pursued Buffy in the same way in which he pursued Bella (his love interest) in 
the Twilight saga.  The two characters appear to meet officially for the first time 
during a sex education class in school.  In this scene, the teacher explains how the sex 
drive in humans is animalistic in nature, and so sets up the idea that Edward’s pursuit 
of Buffy is one driven by animalistic obsession.  He is portrayed as a stalker who lusts 
after Buffy, harassing her at school, in the local club, and at home.  Initially, however, 
Buffy does not view Edward as anything more than an admirer, as discussed in the 
cafeteria with her friend Willow, in which she says she thinks that the way in which 
he watches her is “nothing serious”.  This viewpoint changes however, once she is 
made aware that he is a vampire.  As the video progresses, one is made to see Edward 
in a more threatening role as he declares that he is desperate for Buffy’s blood, and 
that she is his own “personal brand of heroin”.  His desperation is further emphasised 
as he tells Buffy that he does not “have the strength to stay away from [her]”, and 
ultimately drives Buffy to make the choice to slay him.  What ensues is an animalistic 
battle between the masculine predator and his feminine prey, with roles ultimately 
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being reversed, as the prey becomes predator, and slays the demonic Edward Cullen, 
as seen in Stills 7 and 8.  
 
 
  Still 7      Still 8 
 
 
The creator of this video has claimed that he has abided by Section 107 of the 
US Copyright Act, which allows one to utilise copyright protected works based on the 
doctrine of fair use.  However, as per the findings of Aufderheide and Jaszi (2009) on 
participatory media, one notes that the user does not seem to have a firm 
understanding of what constitutes fair use.  This section of the Act states that 
copyrighted work may be utilised for purposes such as “criticism, comment, news 
reporting, teaching, or research”, whilst simultaneously stating that these reasons are 
subject to scrutiny based on whether it is for commercial use, non-profit educational 
use, and the effect that this appropriation may have on the potential market of the 
copyrighted work. 
 
Based on this understanding, the creator is correct in assuming that his work 
constitutes fair use on the grounds that he is not producing it for commercial gain.  
However, the general reasoning for fair use to exist is based on the right for direct 
social commentary, and to utilise various works for teaching and learning purposes.  It 
is highly improbable to assume that this video was created as a teaching aid, and it 
does not appear to contribute much in relation to the critiquing of society.  
Problematically, legal jargon is intended to be read literally, and as such, the 
commentary surrounding the issue of gender and the empowerment of the female 
character made by the creator in this video is one which is implied rather than 
distinctly overt.  Therefore, one can argue that this video does not engage with any 
form of direct social commentary, and subsequently cannot be protected by the 
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doctrine of fair use; however, by claiming that this video has no direct impact on 
social culture, negates the importance that popular culture plays on formulating the 
ways in which society is formed. 
 
It may not fall under the protectorate of fair use, but this does not provide a 
sound enough argument to declare that this video is infringing upon copyright because 
one can argue that this video does possess significant cultural value.  As suggested by 
Rosemary Coombe (1998), individual identity is shaped and formed by the cultural 
context in which one finds themselves, and as global cultures merge within online 
arenas it becomes natural for one to adopt specific traits and practices associated with 
interactive media, in an attempt to navigate this new social environment.  One of the 
most fundamental traits of online behaviour that was established by Internet pioneers, 
as discussed in an earlier chapter of this dissertation, was the prospect that the Internet 
provided a forum for the open and free exchange and sharing of ideas, technology and 
information (Stallman, 1997).  Therefore, one can propose that a video such as Buffy 
vs Twilight is merely the projection of this mindset and culture. 
 
Added to this argument, is that as borders blur and national territories are lost 
through the expansion of the online, social identities are more often formed by what 
one sees being transmitted through popular culture than through the traditional 
channels of nation and territory.  Buffy vs Twilight is therefore an exploration of the 
fusion of two popular cultural icons through an hypothesised scenario, in which the 
resultant conclusion can be viewed as a victory for one particular brand of culture 
over another – the cultural values associated with Buffy the Vampire Slayer, such as 
promoting a strong independent female character, are seen to be triumphant.   One 
could consider that these types of imagined cultural battles, as portrayed within this 
video, are similar to those played out in the press through satirical imagery and 
parody in which different oppositional parties are often seen battling for political or 
social control.  Therefore, the manufacture of mash-up videos in which alternative 
narratives are created, can be viewed as important tools in regard to understanding the 





6.5 Satirical Mash-ups 
 
This does not mean that satire has lost its place within the realms of 
postmodern culture.  Satire has long been a tool for social commentators to poke fun 
at those in power, and the rules governing the conventions of society (Navratil, 2007).  
Digital mash-ups have only helped to increase the platform from which satire and 
social commentary can take place.  Today, we see a plethora of satirists who attempt 
to destabilize traditional discourses and ideologies surrounding a number of socio-
political issues, through the many facets of interactive, digital media.  Consequently, 
users are able to make bold social statements, such as Bush Does Teletubbies and 
Coffee with Chou, without the traditional confines of established institutional media.     
 
One must be aware that satire is a unique form of social commentary which 
gives political and social critics the opportunity to “keep a jaundiced eye on 
democracy” (Lamb, 2004: 4).  This is especially true when exploring the video Bush 
Does Teletubbies.  Within this clip, the sun rises over a peaceful Teletubbyland, but 
the usual baby’s face contained within the sun has been replaced by the face of 
George W Bush.  As he looks down on the grazing rabbits and serene landscape, his 
gaze fires missiles onto the ground below, killing the rabbits and exposing an oil field 
below the surface of the valley.  Overall, it appears that the creator of this video is 
passing comment on Bush and his militant invasion tactics to acquire oil in foreign 
lands.  It can be argued that democracy is only able to truly flourish if those in power 
are continually held accountable for their actions (McIntyre, 2005; Treiger, 1989).  In 
this video, Bush is shown as a violent tyrant destroying a peaceful and harmless 
environment.  As the video continues, oilrigs become apparent within the landscape as 
the oil rises from the missile craters, drowning the rabbits and wiping out the 







It is also interesting to note that the creator of the video chose to leave in the 
laughter which usually emanates from the baby, creating the effect that the infantile 
sounds were made by Bush as he razed the land below.  This, firstly, implies that 
Bush seemed to revel in the destruction that he caused, but secondly, and perhaps 
more importantly, highlights the idea that Bush is a foolish and child-like person, not 
equipped with the maturity to hold any position of power.  This mash-up therefore, 
aims to take a variety of media clips and create a narrative which critically engages 
with social issues.  As such the user is well within their rights in terms of fair use to 
appropriate the media which they have because the aim of the clip is not to gain 
commercial success, but rather offer critical social commentary.    
 
At times, satire borders on a socially unacceptable rhetoric, often being 
labelled as profane, defamatory or discriminatory.  However, it is precisely this 
distortion, and its intentionally false stereotypes of society, that help fuel debate 
surrounding various issues.  It works “through distortion of the familiar – while at the 
same time pretending to depict reality – in order to level criticism” (Treiger, 1989: 
1216).  This is especially true when examining the video Coffee with Chou, whereby 
Paris Hilton is interviewed on a morning talk show by two rabbits.  During the course 
of this video, Paris Hilton is outwitted by the rabbits and exposed as a mindless 
socialite who has only gained fame through her sexual antics.    In doing so, the 
creator of the video raises questions as to why society elevates the social and cultural 
importance of various people.  It can be argued that this video highlights the absurdity 
of giving a person such as Paris Hilton social respect, who, during the course of the 
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video, admits to considering prostitution as a profession, as well as agreeing to a 
statement in which she her mental capacity is compared to that of a “sack of 
hammers”.  Added to this, the creator inserts a picture of the desert over Paris’ head to 
indicate that her mind is barren and lifeless, as well as implying that Paris’ signature 
catchphrase, “That’s hot”, is a reflection of her mentally deserted mind.     
 
David Pritchard (2000: 1) emphasises that in “a variety of direct and indirect 
ways, media content influences what people believe, what they think about and how 
they act”.  Most mainstream media do not offer sufficient social commentary on 
various actions taken by public figures, often due to an overload of information within 
today’s postmodern world (Friedman, 2006; Mirzoeff, 1999).  However, sites such as 
YouTube have given online users a platform from which they are able to share and 
broadcast their own interpretations and satirical works, which otherwise would never 
have been seen.  Therefore, as with traditional forms of satire, these videos aim to 
“explode constraints and add a vital dimension to public discussion of issues” 
(McIntyre, 2005: 4).  However, in order to achieve this and allow for critical satirical 
comment, there are a number of conditions which need to be met.  Chris Lamb (2004) 
indicates that the most important condition needed before satire can be implemented 
is that of free speech.  Without this fundamental stepping stone of democracy, satirists 
would face authoritarian prosecution.  Therefore, it can be argued that by restricting 
the flow of information by too fervently protecting copyright, one would not have the 
opportunity to manufacture satirical videos, such as the ones discussed, thus 
undermining important public debate. 
 
Secondly, Lamb (2004) indicates that those consuming satirical work need to 
have a firm understanding of that which is being parodied.  Therefore, audience 
members need to be somewhat educated regarding political and social affairs, or else 
the work would lose all meaning.  This further emphasises the point, as discussed 
earlier, that mash-ups require some understanding of the material that a user chooses 
to utilise, in order to understand the inherent meanings contained in them.  
Importantly, viewers and creators need must be aware of the general meanings 
associated with various popular cultural formats, in order to navigate the 
interpretations offered by mash-up creators surrounding popular culture.  Mash-ups 
are an art form which rely upon shared assumptions between creators and viewers in 
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regard to popular culture’s various signs and symbols, and consequently if one does 
not possess the same shared knowledge in relation to these indicators, they can appear 
to be merely infringing on copyright and traditional intellectual property rights, rather 
than offering alternative viewpoints and interpretations of the structural confines of 
postmodern society and popular culture.      
 
 6.6  Copyright and New Media in the 21st Century 
 
As one explores the analyses of each video, it becomes clear that users have 
concentrated on developing their own alternative renditions of traditional media.  As 
discussed, mash-ups initially concentrated on creating new variants of pre-existing 
music videos.  At that time, these videos were celebrated by music enthusiasts and 
found a niche audience on the television channel M-TV.  Provided creators gained the 
proper permissions and licences from music producers to use established music 
videos, they were viewed as ingenious new musical products.  However, music 
moguls did not foresee the emergence of video sharing sites and the monumental 
developments within digital technology.  Internet users soon had the means to 
digitally alter any piece of digital media that they were able to gain access to, usually 
without any permissions or licences granted, and due to the popularity of video mash-
ups that music enthusiasts saw on M-TV, began mimicking the practices of those 
digital DJ’s who had gained the necessary licences to utilise such work (Montgomery, 
2005). 
 
However, these artists were obviously unable to gain any exposure through 
formal media channels, such as M-TV, due to the supposed illegality of their creations, 
and subsequently found a home on Internet sharing sites such as YouTube.  As 
previously mentioned, before one is able to upload any form of video on the YouTube 
site, one is expected to register with the site, and in doing so, is required to read the 
terms of use and accept the rules imposed by the site.  Consequently, by agreeing to 
these terms when one registers, as with many online service providers, the 
responsibility of monitoring what users engage with falls under the auspices of other 
users and not with the site itself (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  Sites such as YouTube 
claim that they merely provide a service, and that it is not their responsibility to 
monitor how users choose to use such a service (www.youtube.com/t/terms).  Apart 
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from this argument, YouTube does stipulate that users who are reported three times for 
uploading videos which do not have the correct licences and permissions will have 
their accounts suspended indefinitely, and have all of their videos, not only the ones to 
be deemed illegal, blocked from the site. 
 
Problematically, there are two main issues which underline this practice.  
Firstly, YouTube relies solely on the reportage by other users of infringing material 
because, as mentioned, they do not patrol what users choose to upload, because 
realistically it becomes practically impossible to monitor the millions of users (72 
million in 2006∗) who use the site.  Therefore, this creates an environment which does 
not actively condemn copyright infringement, and so gives the impression that 
uploading copyrighted material is fair, provided one does not get caught.  This leads 
onto the second problem with this attitude, in which users who have had their 
accounts suspended are not prevented from re-registering with the site using a 
different user name, and re-posting the infringing material.  As such, users are never 
actually punished for their actions, and because they do not look to profit from their 
work cannot be prosecuted by the state. 
 
In fact, the only entity which does seem to profit from these videos is YouTube 
itself, as they sell advertising space around those videos which garner the most views.  
However, this is not deemed illegal because YouTube has the luxury to claim that they 
are not profiting from the content directly, but merely from the Internet traffic which 
visits their site.  Copyright holders such as Warner Music are now beginning to take 
note of this, and as such have entered into agreements with YouTube to garner a 
percentage of the profits taken from advertising from videos revenues in which users 
have appropriated their copyrighted material (Van Buskirk, 2009).  What is 
interesting to note is that this resolution was made because Warner Music found that 
they lost more revenue by not allowing their music to be seen online than if they 
continued to allow it to be hosted by YouTube. 
 
This seems to strengthen the arguments discussed earlier in this dissertation, in 
which writers such as Alfino (1991), Vaidhyathan (2001) and Pistorius (2006) 
                                                 
∗ Weber, 2006. Available from: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/business/6036023.stm  
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indicated that copyright is more concerned with protecting the control of ideas rather 
than the protection of creativity itself.  The videos discussed may have appropriated 
material from other sources, but it is those who traditionally maintain control within 
the media environment that are still being rewarded financially.  Because companies 
such as Warner Music are profiting from user collaborations, it becomes difficult to 
argue that users are infringing on intellectual property rights or undermining the 
profits which could be made by various media corporations.  One cannot argue that 
the creations which are showcased on YouTube are illegal if one is happy enough to 
accept the profits made on the advertising which supports it.   
 
This argument is supported by television programmes such as Clipz in South 
Africa, which concentrates on broadcasting any online video which they find to be 
popular on a variety of video sharing sites.  They do not pay any of the creators for 
the use of these videos, but the programme itself does bring in advertising revenue for 
the network on which it is stationed.  Therefore, what can be noted is that if copyright 
were instilled by the same standards as media corporations, these mainstream media 
networks would be liable for copyright infringement themselves.  As both American 
law and South African law discuss, copyright is infringed upon when creative works 
are broadcast without permission, apart from when one “borrows” material to create 
an alternative rendition. 
 
However, one could argue that because these users have chosen to publicly 
display their work in an open forum aimed at freely sharing information, they do in 
some respect forfeit the control surrounding their intellectual property rights.  This 
may be the case, and one could argue that the utilisation of material which was not put 
online in the same manner is infringement, because the original author did not consent 
to sharing their work in the same manner as users who willingly post videos online.  
Problematically though, the media which is so fervently protected is that which is the 
most integrated into culture.  Much of the way in which society makes sense of the 
world is through its interaction with the media and the values associated with these 
media forms.  Therefore, it becomes an important tool which people use in order to 
make sense of the world around them. 
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Each of the videos discussed in this chapter have utilised media in a variety of 
ways, for a number of reasons.  However, one common theme which seems to arise is 
that the creation of these collaborations is driven by two distinct factors.  Firstly, 
many videos seem to celebrate the media from which it has been appropriated in some 
way, often highlighting those scenes which have made the most impact on society, or 
that which is the most well-remembered by viewers of popular culture.  Secondly, and 
possibly more importantly, is that users need to require an in-depth technical and 
cultural knowledge of that which they are utilising.  Without such knowledge, each of 
these videos would not carry the alternate meanings which they demonstrate and 
therefore could be deemed as copyright theft.  However, because the varied 
interpretations of these videos do in a sense make them new, they themselves are 
merely contributing to the extension of culture.   
 
One could argue that simply creating new meaning for something does not 
excuse users from taking the creative work of another for their own personal benefit.  
Problematically though, if one gauges media history, one would find that most of that 
which is found in popular culture has been appropriated from some earlier format.  
Disney, for example, who is one of the most stringent enforcers of copyright, has 
based many of their characters on old medieval fairytales, such as Snow White, 
Cinderella, and Sleeping Beauty.  Scrooge McDuck, the uncle of the famed Donald 
Duck, is based on the character Scrooge, unceremoniously lifted from Charles 
Dickens’ classic novel A Christmas Carol, and even Steamboat Willie, the cartoon 
which launched Mickey Mouse, was “a direct cartoon parody of Steamboat Bill Jr.” 
(Lessig, 2004: 22) – the last silent film made by the comic Buster Keaton.  Each of 
these examples demonstrates that Disney has maintained many of the same storylines 
which are associated with these characters, and yet they claim to have authorship and 
full intellectual property rights over their renditions of these non-original creations. 
 
No-one can deny that these characters have become intrinsic figures within 
popular culture, and it therefore stands to reason that creators today should be given 
the same allowances to manipulate those creations which have shaped their 
understanding of society.  Social culture cannot grow without direct interaction by 
those who inhabit it.  This becomes even more relevant in today’s postmodern world, 
in which cultural identities are becoming more fragmented, as national boundaries 
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become less relevant and one is influenced more by the values of popular culture.  As 
such, one cannot deem digital mash-ups as the illegal act of copyright infringers, but 
should rather acknowledge that is simply a new way in which popular culture is 
developed and commented upon. 
 
The initial argument for the protection of copyright was to grant authors a 
limited monopoly over their work in order to produce an incentive to create more 
artistic works.  While this worked for many years, it became more of a detriment for 
artistic creation as companies aimed to extend their monopoly periods, so as not to 
forfeit control of their industries (Woker, 2006).  The only incentive that began to 
drive various artists was the need to gain employment from these production houses.  
However, the idea that artists would not create without some form of incentive seems 
to have been lost if one examines the massive pool of digital mash-ups within the 
online realm.  Most of these videos have been created, not for money or incentives, 
but merely out of artistic passion.  Users are more interested in allowing their works 
to be seen, than being rewarded for them.  Obviously through the power of the 
Internet, some do gain fame and can make money from their video, but none seem to 
set out to do this initially. 
 
Therefore, it becomes possible to argue that the role of copyright has changed 
from when it was first conceptualised.  No longer are artists bound by incentive rules 
to showcase their work, but instead have the opportunity to share their work through 
sites such as YouTube.  Copyright, while not redundant, needs to be thought of in new 
ways, in order to protect artists while simultaneously promoting the development of 
culture.  One needs to recognise that mash-up videos, such as the ones analysed, are 
not threatening the livelihoods of artists by undermining their financial rewards, or 
even their moral rights.  Instead, these creations are providing important commentary 
on a society which has become deeply indebted to the influence of popular culture.  
These videos aim to re-conceptualise mainstream media, and in part try to make other 
users re-think aspects of the world in which they find themselves interacting. 
 
Copyright has become a law which is so focussed on allowing those in power 
to maintain control over the development of culture, that one forgets that it was 
originally formulated to propel culture forward through the advancement of ideas.  
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Gaining financial reward was only a small part of the process, and aimed to protect 
individual authors, not multi-billion dollar corporations.  However, what has emerged 
from modern society is the protection of these giants so that their ideologies and belief 
systems stay at the forefront of society.  The introduction of sites such as YouTube, 
which allow users to question, change and manipulate these ideals, has led to a 
contentious hegemonic battle in which dominant culture is being reassessed, and 
ultimately redeveloped by users.  No longer are consumers of media passive in its 
production (Marshall, 2004).  Instead, media consumers have become their own 
producers of content as well; however one cannot expect any creative depth in 
production unless Internet users are given some leeway in terms of interacting with 
that which is already exists within cultural products.   As such, copyright experts and 
lawmakers need to be made aware of the importance that online user/media 
collaboration plays in the development of both popular culture, and in societal culture.   
If Internet users are not allowed to utilise that which permeates their everyday 
existence, it undermines free speech and ultimately creates a totalitarian rulership over 




















Chapter Seven – Conclusion: 
 
Copyright and intellectual property rights have always been protected on the 
grounds that they helped to secure financial security for one’s artistic creations.  
Problematically, as the Internet evolved and digital technologies became more 
interactive it allowed users the means to share information freely and openly online.  
This led to a number of media corporations launching lawsuits against users who 
shared various forms of media without ever having to buy any media products.  One 
of the most famous cases was the prosecution of Shawn Fanning, who through the 
development of the peer-to-peer sharing site Napster, gave Internet users the facility 
to download vast amounts of music free.  Whilst it was acknowledged that borrowing 
and sharing music amongst one’s peers was legal, it was not legal to share 
information with such a vast quantity of users.  Record companies claimed that a site 
like Napster would severely cut their profits, and ultimately they would lose millions 
from the practice of file-sharing (Goldsmith & Wu, 2006).  The courts agreed, and so 
Napster was shut-down, and file-sharing became an illegal and taboo practice. 
 
While it appeared that record companies would maintain control over the 
industry, they failed to see the impact that digital technology would continue to play 
in the consumer market.  As the Internet grew and digital connections became faster, 
it soon became possible to share video files.  Initially users concentrated on uploading 
and sharing home-movie type videos, however some realised the potential that the 
service could play in showcasing their artistic digital creations.  Inspired by the 
techniques of early DJ’s, in which they would mix a number of musical pieces 
together (Vaidhyathan, 2001), online users began mixing various forms of sounds and 
images in order to make their own renditions of various music videos, movie trailers, 
and narratives. 
 
These mash-ups soon gained in popularity and eventually became 
commonplace among video sharing sites.  However, many users chose to utilise 
pieces of media from well-known and established record labels and production 
houses, and so an ensuing copyright battle began.  These media corporations have 
cited that utilising media which they own is infringing on their copyright, and have 
attempted to block sites such as YouTube from hosting such videos.  Nevertheless, 
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users continue to manufacture mash-ups, citing fair use as a protectorate for their 
actions.  Problematically though, many users do not understand what is actually meant 
by the term fair use, and so often this argument is null and void (Aufderheide and 
Jaszi, 2009). 
 
This dissertation has attempted to investigate if copyright law is too strict in 
the way that it is implemented, and as such, whether creations such as digital mash-
ups can prove that copyright needs to be re-thought.  What has emerged are a number 
of important trends.  One of the most important aspects to be highlighted is the 
wording of copyright law, in which it is claimed that for a work to be granted 
copyright it needs to be original.  Obviously in terms of digital mash-ups, none can be 
deemed original; however, this is not where the problem lies.  The issue is contained 
in the fact that media corporations claim originality for their work, and as such, others 
cannot gain access to it without express prior consent.  However, when examining a 
variety of mash-ups in the last chapter, one can note that much of the media which has 
been utilised has itself drawn from a variety of older media forms.  The Ghostbusters 
music video, for example, directly played on Michael Jackson’s Thriller video.  The 
media of popular culture has become popular precisely for its ability to make 
intertextual references and to be self-reflexive.  Therefore, it seems like a foolhardy 
argument to state that one should be granted copyright based on a product’s 
originality. 
 
The main reason for granting copyright is that it is supposed to reward the 
author for their work, and in so doing allow them the opportunity to produce other 
creations.  However, what has been highlighted is that it is no longer the individual 
who is protected; instead, copyright seems to favour protecting the acquisitions of 
large corporations (Pistorius, 2006).  Consequently copyright has become a tool used 
not for creating incentives, but rather as something which helps to maintain the 
control of dominant corporations.  As such, what one notices when investigating why 
mash-ups have become such a contentious media format, is that users often create 
alternative scenarios to that which the owners of the work initially created.  This in 
turn undermines the values and ideologies which have been instilled within society 
and culture through mainstream popular media, and consequently supports the claims 
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made by Alfino (1991), who stated that the control of knowledge through copyright is 
ultimately the control of culture. 
 
What one notices emerging through a creative form such as mash-ups, is the 
gradual shift that has begun to happen in terms of culture construction.  Consumers 
are no longer at the mercy of mainstream media, but are now able to interact far more 
easily with that which they consume.  Mash-up videos allow users the opportunity to 
pass comment on that which is embedded into the make-up of postmodern society.  
The way in which culture and identity are formed is becoming a more interactive 
practice, whereby one is able to produce and personalise specific media experiences 
to their own tastes.  Therefore, YouTube has become a type of battleground for 
hegemonic warfare in which users are undermining and re-developing the ideologies 
which have been instilled through mainstream media.  A video such as Toy Story 2 
Requiem is one in which the user contradicts the innocence usually associated with 
Disney productions, and subverts it by turning it into a narrative filled with drugs and 
prostitution.  This downplays the innocence of Disney and creates a more realistic 
impression of the world in which everything does not always have a happy ending. 
 
All interpretations regarding each of the mash-ups examined in this 
dissertation is purely subjective, and as such proves the importance of such creations 
within society.  Each video possesses a different angle from which one is able to 
comment on society and culture.  Without such works it is possible that individual 
critique would be slowly eroded by the dominant forces within the media industry.  
Without interactivity, and the opportunity to engage with mainstream media as the 
creators of mash-ups do, there would be little which either contradicted or commented 
upon popular culture.  As such, mash-ups can play an important role in holding those 
in power within the media, accountable for that which they produce, and subsequently 
provide an alternative view to dominant culture. 
 
It would be naïve to suggest that online users do not partake in genuine 
copyright theft, and this dissertation does not suggest that this type of practice should 
be condoned.  What it does suggest, however, is that creations such as mash-ups have 
become important tools within the public sphere with regard to commenting on 
popular culture.   One cannot make sweeping statements assuming that all users who 
 104
utilise the work of contemporary media in order to create their own variations are 
engaged in copyright theft.  As this dissertation has demonstrated, each video needs to 
be examined individually in order to negotiate the meanings crafted by various users, 
and to determine if theft has inordinately occurred.  Generally, what one finds is that 
these users have created meaningful interpretations of popular culture, and as such 
should not be condemned for using that which they comment on as a creative base. 
 
Instead, these users have taken the public platform of the Internet to a new 
dimension, evolving from the distribution of written information and knowledge 
toward more visual and interactive formats through which one is able to critique the 
formation of society and culture.  One needs to acknowledge that the Internet itself 
has changed and grown in the ways it expects online users to interact – changes which 
these users have embraced as a means to express themselves.  One could argue that it 
is important to think of the online world as its own definitive culture in which users 
need to follow the societal structures of interaction.  Just as one needs to follow the 
rules of specific cultures to be understood and accepted in the “real” world, so do 
users who engage within the medium of digital technology.  Importantly, this leads 
one to assume that the reason users have invested so heavily in the art of digital mash-
ups is that firstly, it is a way in which they are attempting to navigate a new social 
structure, but that secondly, it is the actually the structures created by the digital 
environment which have made users interact in this way.   
 
If the Internet had not evolved in the ways in which it did, users would be 
engaging in other forms of communicatory practices in order to make sense of their 
environments.  As such, it becomes difficult to justify prosecuting those users who are 
appropriating media in an attempt to communicate a wide array of ideas within an 
environment which continually expects users to interact and be social.  Therefore, this 
dissertation proposes that whilst copyright is not an obsolete practice, as many artists’ 
livelihoods still depend on the monopolies of their works, some aspects of copyright 
law do need to be relaxed.  As mentioned, one cannot make generalisations claiming 
that all appropriation is theft, undermining the works of paid creative artists.  Instead, 
these acts need to be examined individually, and considered for their social 
commentary and worth.   
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What is even more crucial, however, is the acceptance that copyright law has 
become a conundrum within the online world.  Due to the borderless nature of the 
Internet, and the territorial nature of copyright, it becomes very difficult to control the 
practices of users who are situated all over the world.  Each country has its own 
unique set of copyright laws, and whilst many have now entered into international 
agreements in an effort to curb piracy and information theft, users are still bound by 
national laws.  Even laws that are as similar in nature as South Africa and the United 
States, have fundamental differences between them.  South Africa, for example, has 
very limited structures in place with regard to online practices – the most recent 
addition being made in 1992 – which makes it very difficult to determine what course 
of action should be taken in terms of Internet sharing, as these laws were developed 
before the Internet was even introduced into the country.  Even the United States, 
which has some of the most up-to-date copyright laws, is outdated in terms of the 
Internet – the last addition was made in 2001. 
 
This dissertation thus suggests that due to the changing nature of global 
communicatory practices, copyright should begin to be thought of not as independent, 
national law, but instead as global agreement.  Whilst currently various nations have 
entered into such agreements, they still do not hold as much weight as national laws 
because they function as mere guidelines, and are not instilled as global policy.  
However, to consider global agreements on this scale may be a rather utopian ideal 
because it then asks nations not only to agree, but to determine which aspects of their 
own laws should fall away in order to create consistent policy.  Even more 
problematically, however, is that those countries which do not possess as much power 
as more dominant global players, may be forced into agreements which undermine 
their needs, and ultimately reinforce the power of dominant entities (Litman, 2001).  
Highlighting the idealistic nature of such agreements helps to affirm the claim that 
digital mash-ups are an important addition to global society, because they give many 
who are not in dominant societal positions the ability to engage critically with that 
which surrounds them.  It is evident that those who have dominant positions within 
society often dictate the laws and structures of a society, and as such it is 




Therefore, one can view mash-ups as an important element of free speech 
which allows common citizens the opportunity to hold those in control of popular 
culture accountable for their actions.  It is unlikely that this type of interaction is 
going to topple those in power; however, it does help to ensure that such power does 
not become a completely authoritarian dominance.  This dissertation has argued that 
copyright may become a tool of dominant cultural corporations to maintain control 
over society, and as such, claims that its infringement in fact constitutes a certain loss 
of this (dominant) control, thus verifying that copyright, as traditionally 
conceptualised, no longer protects the individual artist, but instead proposes to protect 
large capitalist corporations and dominant power players from competition in an 
effort to help to expand their control (Lessig, 2004). 
 
It appears that the law no longer seems to recognise the distinction between 
those who re-publish the work of the author without permission, and those which 
build upon creative work in order to further the development of society (Lessig, 
2004).  This dissertation has established that this is an important distinction to make 
as more Internet users create important social and cultural commentary through 
mediums such as digital mash-up.  Therefore, it must be noted that this is a key issue 
which needs to be discussed and recognised when devising amendments to copyright 
acts.  It can be acknowledged that the Internet has played an important part in 
changing the way in which citizens engage within the public sphere.  Consequently, 
law-makers need to recognise this and adjust copyright laws and agreements as such 
to protect democratic development and free speech.  Currently the laws of South 
Africa and the United States are dismally outdated with very few amendments having 
been made since the inception of the Internet, or even more problematically, since the 
transformation of media from analogue to digital. 
 
This research has shown that large corporations such as Disney are quick to 
defend their copyrights, often claiming that any form of unauthorised use of 
copyrighted material is unlawful.  However, this dissertation has also highlighted how 
culture can only grow if citizens are given the opportunity to both engage with it, and 
to challenge the culture which surrounds it.  It was this type of interaction that 
allowed the Disney corporation to grow as immensely as it did.  Without the influence 
and utilisation of past cultures into the work of Walt Disney, it is unlikely that he 
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would have formulated such an intrinsic aspect of modern day popular culture.  As 
Lawrence Lessig (2004: 24) describes, “Disney ripped creativity from the culture 
around him, mixed that creativity with his own extraordinary talent, and then burned 
that mix into the soul of his culture”, just as modern day creative artists “rip” digital 
media into “pieces”, re-mix it into the form of a mash-up, and then “burn” these 
creations to disc to be uploaded onto video-sharing sites.  Therefore, it can be argued 
that online mash-up artists are the new creators of popular culture who need to be 
acknowledged as such, and not labelled as thieves or deviants.  This argument does 
not propose, however, that all mashers intend to create work which will be of benefit 
for cultural development, and as such, more ethnographic research should be done to 
explore why mashers choose to engage with media in the ways that they do.  
Consequently, it would be of interest to determine if online users are aware of the role 
that they are playing in cultural development, or if in fact they are subscribing to this 
behaviour based on the structures which they find themselves to be a part of.   
 
This dissertation has limited itself in terms of the type of medium investigated, 
and further study with regard to intellectual property rights is needed to determine the 
role that online technologies can play in societal development.  This research has been 
important in developing the idea, through the investigation of video mash-ups, that 
intellectual property rights need to be re-thought in order to protect the future 
development of culture; however, the use of photographs, music and video to develop 
online personas in environments such as MySpace, Facebook and Digg, are 
themselves important tools when attempting to address the issue of cultural and 
identity formation within postmodern society.   
 
Apart from this, one of the most interesting issues which this dissertation was 
unable to explore in detail, but which needs to be investigated, is an ethical 
examination surrounding the exploitation of online users’ intellectual property by 
large media corporations to supplement their own production needs.  This would help 
supplement the argument that copyright laws have shifted to protect capitalist 
conglomerates rather than individual artists.  With this said, however, this research 
has been able to establish the continued dominance of mainstream media corporations 
through their stringent control over copyright, and in doing so, demonstrated the need 
for ideologies, with regard to copyright and intellectual property rights, to change.  
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Society needs to recognise the value that certain types of copyright infringement can 
have in terms of its own cultural progress.  It is often debated whether the media 
shape society, or if society shapes the media, but whatever the answer, this 
conundrum recognises the importance and power of media consumers.  The 
introduction of mashers into the media landscape cannot be dismissed as deviants 
aimed at toppling the control of dominant ideologies, but instead should be seen as 
just another team of players within the hegemonic battle of culture.    
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